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TWENTY YEARS AFTER: REFLECTIONS ON THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN
ARKANSAS-ARTICLES 3 AND 4
Arthur G. Murphey Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The Arkansas Legislature adopted the Uniform Commercial Code
in 1961 with the passage of Act No. 185.1 The Act became effective
January 1, 1962, and citations to the Code began to appear in the ap-
pellate cases a few years later. So the Code has been in effect for ap-
proximately twenty years. It has been amended and revised since then
from time to time, the last major change occuring in 1973 when Act
116 adopted the 1972 Official Text.2 The changes reflected by that
Text mainly affected Article 9. Changes in Article 8 are reflected in
the 1978 Official Text, and it is possible that these changes will soon be
adopted in Arkansas also. Work is now underway to revise Articles 3
and 4 by means of the New Uniform Payments Code.' All of these
changes have been the result of the continuing work to have the Code
provide meaningful solutions to current problems.
This article will not summarize all the statutes enacted and the
cases which have construed the Uniform Commercial Code over the
past twenty years. Rather it will focus on five areas, not always with
the same goal in mind. In some instances the goal is to illustrate and
comment on the direction the courts have taken. In others it is to ex-
amine certain problems that have not arisen in Arkansas, but that
might arise. Suggested solutions are based on the words of the sections
(and comments) or on interpretations already given by the courts to
sections or a combination of these. In still other instances the goal is
*Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; A.B. University of North Carolina,
1951; J.D. University of Mississippi, 1953; LL.M. Yale University, 1962. The author thanks the
Arkansas Bar Foundation, which awarded the author a summer research fellowship. The author
also thanks Professors D. Fenton Adams and L. Scott Stafford for their helpful comments.
I. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 85-1-101 to 85-9-507 (1961).
2. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 85-1-105, 85-1-201, 85-2-107, 85-5-116, 85-9-101 et seq. (Supp.
1983).
3. For a discussion of some of the work on the NUPC and how it could affect certain code
provisions, see Benfield, The New Payments Code and the Abolition of Holder in Due Course
Status as to Consumer Checks, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11 (1983).
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simply to explain the meaning of a section of the Code. Sometimes this
is best done by examining prior law to see what change the section was
supposed to bring about. Sometimes it is best to work with concepts
and principles.
Article 3 is entitled "Commercial Paper." It is concerned with ne-
gotiable instruments, their issue, transfer, and discharge, and the rights
and duties that attach to them. Article 4 is entitled "Bank Deposits and
Collections" and is concerned primarily with the collection of one type
of negotiable instrument, the check. It devotes some sections to the col-
lection of the documentary draft, and by providing for the collection of
"items", 4 it can apply to nonnegotiable instruments sent through the
banking system for collection. But primarily Article 4 is called on to
determine the rights and duties of parties involved in the collection of
checks by banks. There is then a close relationship between the two
articles and they will not be separated below.
I. FOUR WORDS AND THEIR APPLICATION
A. "Assignment"
The first area to be discussed is that of words found in the Uni-
form Commercial Code or used by courts in their opinions (even
though the words are not so used in the Code). Let us start with a word
that the courts have used but that the Code does not define. In such
cases it is helpful if such a word describes a person or thing or process
in a way familiar to those who work in the particular fields involved (in
this case the fields of contract law and property law).
Begin with the process of transfer of an instrument. Even if an
instrument is negotiable it may be transferred by a method other than
negotiation. Such a transfer occurs if the holder of an instrument paya-
ble to his order fails to indorse it when he transfers it.5 The best word
4. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-104(I)(g) (1961) provides:
"Item" means any instrument for the payment of money even though it is not negotiable but
does not include money.
5. ARK. STAT. ANN.. § 85-3-201(l) (1961) describes the effect of a transfer in general:
Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor has
therein, except that a transferee who has himself been a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting the instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or claim
against it cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder in due course.
§ 85-3-202(l) is concerned with a particular kind of transfer, a negotiation:
Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the transferee becomes a
holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated by delivery with any neces-
sary indorsement; if payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery.
The Code does not provide a word to describe transfers that are not negotiations.
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to describe this transfer is probably "assignment". In 1971 the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court twice referred to notes as being "assigned." ' How-
ever, in 1972 it said that "the U.C.C. does not permit assignments of
negotiable instruments ... the note must be transferred or negoti-
ated."17 "Negotiated" is a technical word. It is used in a sense different
from that in the sentences "The nations negotiated a treaty" and "The
parties negotiated but failed to reach an agreement on the contract."
"Negotiated" is the proper term to describe transferring a negotiable
instrument with needed indorsements. But it is submitted that "trans-
ferred" is not the only proper term for describing the transfer of a ne-
gotiable instrument without a needed indorsement. "Assigned" should
be an acceptable word to describe what is done. And it might be even
better than "transfer." For consider section 3-417(2) which begins,
"Any person who transfers an instrument. . . warrants . . . and if the
transfer is by indorsement .. ,"8 Thus there can be a transfer with or
6. Byrd v. Security Bank, 250 Ark. 214, 215, 464 S.W.2d 578, 579 (1971); Griffith v. Grif-
fith, 250 Ark. 845, 846, 467 S.W.2d 737, 738 (1971). In Byrd, the court apparently was using the
word to refer to a note that had been negotiated. It also did this in two later cases, Richardson v.
Girner, 282 Ark. 302, 302-04, 668 S.W.2d 523, 524-25 (1984), and Bryan v. Easton Tire Co., 262
Ark. 731, 732, 561 S.W.2d 79, 79 (1978). The Court of Appeals did the same in Parker v.
Pledger, 269 Ark. 925, 927, 601 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980). In none of these did the
court comment on the proper use of "assignment". In Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F.
Supp. 1200, 1212 (E.D. Ark. 1972) a federal court used the word "assignee" to refer to the
pledgee of a note who took it without an indorsement that was needed for negotiation.
It may be objected that the word "assignee" is proper only in the case of a negotiation since
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-110 (1961) provides that an instrument is payable to order (and hence
negotiable) when it is payable "to the ... assigns of any person ...." However, this is probably
a concession to people who use the word "assigns" thinking that it means the same as "holders."
Since they mean for the instrument to be negotiable, the drafters provided a way for their inten-
tion to govern. The word "assigns" has long been associated with conveyancing. It is significant
that the drafters did not use the word "assignees." The heart of negotiable instrument law is that
there is such a person as a holder in due course with rights superior to those of a mere assignee (of
contract rights).
The case of Bryan v. Bartlett, 435 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1970) may be of some interest at this
point. It was governed by the federal common law. There was probably no indorsement of an
instrument to the receiver of the holder. Although this is not certain from the facts, it seems most
likely. Yet the court held that the receiver was a "holder." 435 F.2d at 34. Compare Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 85-3-110(I)(f) (1961) which lets "successors" of the holder of an office "act as if... they
. ..were the holder."
7. Mcllroy Bk. v. First Nat'l. Bk., 252 Ark. 558, 560, 480 S.W.2d 127, 128 (1972).
8. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-417(2) (1961) provides:
Any person who transfers an instrument and receives consideration warrants to his
transferee and if the transfer is by indorsement to any subsequent holder who takes the
instrument in good faith that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain payment or accept-
ance on behalf of one who has a good title and the transfer is otherwise rightful; and
(b) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(c) the instrument has not been materially altered; and
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without an indorsement. If an instrument is payable to order, a transfer
without an indorsement is not a negotiation. 9 If the instrument is paya-
ble to the order of the indorser a transfer by indorsement is a negotia-
tion.' 0 If an instrument is payable to bearer, a transfer with or without
an indorsement is a negotiation."' So the U.C.C. uses "transfer" in a
general sense to cover both negotiation and a transfer that is not a
negotiation. Using the word "assignment" would distinguish the trans-
fer that is not a negotiation from one that is.
The word "assignment" is recognized as describing the transfer of
a negotiable instrument in section 3-202(3) which provides that an in-
dorsement purporting to convey less than the entire instrument or un-
paid residue "operates only as a partial assignment.' 2 So the U.C.C.
indicates that the use of the word to describe a kind of transfer is
acceptable.
B. "Order"
Turning to another word, "order", we find that it is used in two
senses in the Code. An instrument may contain an order (and be a
check or a draft) or a promise (and be a note). 3 So the first sense
reflects the kind of instrument involved. On the other hand an instru-
ment may be payable to order or to bearer.' 4 So the second sense re-
flects who may be a holder. Thus an instrument containing an order (a
check) may be payable to order or to bearer. The instrument in Parker
v. Pledger15 contained a promise, and it also could have been payable
to order or bearer. But it was payable to neither because the name of
the payee had been left blank. The court held that it was "not in fact a
note" and then cited section 85-3-102(1)(b) as requiring that "the in-
strument [sic] to whom the promise to pay is addressed must be identi-
fied with reasonable certainty."'" But section 85-3-102(1)(b) refers to
(d) no defense of any party is good against him; and
(e) he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding instituted with respect to the
maker or acceptor or the drawer of an unaccepted instrument.
9. Id. § 85-3-202(1), supra, note 5.
10. Id.
I. Id.
12. Id. § 85-3-202(3) (1961) provides: "An indorsement is effective for negotiation only when
it conveys the entire instrument or any unpaid residue. If it purports to be of less it operates only
as a partial assignment."
13. Id. § 85-3-104(1)(b) (1961).
14. Id. § 85-3-104(l)(d) (1961).
15. 269 Ark. 925, 601 S.W.2d 897 (Ark. App. 1980).
16. 269 Ark. at 930, 601 S.W.2d at 900. The section referred to, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-
102(l)(b) (1961), provides: "An order is a direction io pay and must be more than an authoriza-
[Vol. 7:523
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an "order" in the first sense above, that where a check is involved. The
instrument in this case was meant to be a note and so was governed by
section 85-3-102(l)(c) which sets out the requirement of a promise.
17
However the problem is concerned with section 85-3-110 which refers
to "order" in the second sense above. It applies to checks and notes
both. A blank space does not qualify under section 85-3-110(a) so as to
make the instrument payable to order."' Nor does it qualify under sec-
tion 85-3-111 so as to make it payable to bearer. 19 Rather it is an in-
complete instrument under section 85-3-115.20 So the result in the case
was correct.
C. "Signature"
The next word is found in a section which provides that "No per-
son is liable on an instrument until his signature appears thereon. ' 1
How does a "signature" differ from a "name"? In Douglas v. Citizens
tion or request. It must identify the person to pay with reasonable certainty. It may be addressed
to one or more such persons jointly or in the alternative but not in succession."
17. Id. § 85-3-102(I)(c) provides:" "A promise is an undertaking to pay and must be more
than an acknowledgment of an obligation."
18. Id. § 85-3-110(l) provides:
An instrument is payable to order when by its terms it is payable to the order or assigns
of any person therein specified with reasonable certainty, or to him or his order, or the
like and names a payee. It may be payable to the order of
(a) the maker or drawer; or
(b) the drawee, or
(c) a payee who is not maker, drawer or drawee; or
(d) two [2] or more payees together or in the alternative; or
(e) an estate, trust or fund, in which case it is payable to the order of the represen-
tative of such estate, trust or fund or his successors; or
(f) an office; or an officer by his title as such in which case it is payable to the
principal but the incumbent of the office or his successor may act as if he or
they were the holder; or
(g) a partnership or unincorporated association, in which case it is payable to the
partnership or association and may be indorsed or transferred by any person
thereto authorized.
19. Id. § 85-3-111 (1961) provides: "An instrument is payable to bearer when by its term it
is payable to
(a) bearer or the order of bearer; or
(b) a specified person or bearer; or
(c) cash or the order of cash, or any other indication which does not purport to designate a specific
payee."
20. Id. § 85-3-115(1) provides: "When a paper whose contents at the time of signing show
that it is intended to become an instrument is signed while still incomplete in any necessary re-
spect it cannot be enforced until completed in accordance with authority given it is effective as
completed."
21. Id. § 85-3-401(1), (1961) provides: "No person is liable on an instrument unless his
signature appears thereon."
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Bank22 the bank had stamped on the back of a check "pay to any
bank-P.E.G. Citizens Bank of Jonesboro, Jonesboro, Arkansas." This
was held not to be the bank's acceptance (meaning its signature).
Rather the court was convinced by testimony that in the Jonesboro
area the stamp served only to identify the bank. This conclusion fits
with a definition of "signature" which requires that it be a person's
name or symbol of some sort which is put on an instrument with an
"intention to authenticate it."23 In a later case, however, the court held
that the issuance of a personal money order bearing the bank's printed
name at the top "evidences the [bank's] intent to be bound thereby."24
D. "Customer"
Who is a "customer" of a bank as that term is used in Article 4?
Part four of the Article is entitled "Relationship between Payor Bank
and its Customer." The first six sections25 refer to the "customer's"
rights and duties. The seventh2 6 refers to the "drawer or maker" of an
item. Usually there is no problem. The customer is the person who
opens the account and draws checks on it. So the words "customer"
and "drawer" are nearly always interchangeable. But questions have
arisen when an account is in the name of a legal entity. For example,
banks are liable to "customers" for wrongful dishonor.27 If a bank
wrongfully dishonors a check drawn on a partnership account, is it lia-
ble to the partners for harm to them individually or only to the partner-
ship for harm to it?28 In Arkansas the problem of defining "customer"
arose not because of wrongful dishonor but because of alleged wrongful
payment out of an account.2 9 It was a claimed that the plaintiff in a
suit against the bank was not a customer. The account was styled
"Holiday Inn-Operating Account." The plaintiff had set up the ac-
count, with himself as one of three people who were to have authority
22. 244 Ark. 168, 424 S.W.2d 532 (1968).
23. Menke v. Bd. of Educ., 211 N.W.2d 601, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 675 (Iowa 1973).
24. Sequoyah State Bank v. Union National Bank, 274 Ark. 1, 621 S.W.2d 683 (1981). For
potential problems that this holding could cause, see Murphey, Acceptance and Dishonor: Payable
Through Drafts and Personal Money Orders, 5 UALR L. J. 519 (1982).
25. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 85-4-401 to 406 (1961).
26. Id. § 85-4-407, (1961).
27. Id. § 85-4-402, (1961).
28. For cases reaching different conclusions, see Loucks v. Albuquerque National Bank, 76
N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966) (held that the bank was not liable because the individual partners
were not customers) and Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949,
123 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1975) (distinguished Loucks and held that corporate officers could recover for
wrongful dishonor of a corporation check.)
29. First Nat'l Bank of Springdale v. Hobbs, 248 Ark. 76, 450 S.W.2d 298 (1970).
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to sign checks on it. The court, citing section 85-4-104, held that he
was the "customer . . .but, to say the least, he was certainly as much
a customer as" one of the other two with authority to sign and so had a
right to complain. 0
II. CONTRACT AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
INSTRUMENTS
In dealing with commercial paper it helps to keep in mind that the
subject matter is governed by contract law and property law. As far as
contract law is concerned the contracting parties on the instrument
promise to do only one thing: pay money.3 1 As far as property law is
concerned the parties have rights in a type of personal property, a
chose in action. 2
A. Contract
Several cases in Arkansas have been concerned with the "con-
tract" nature of an instrument. They remind us that instruments may
fail to comply with U.C.C. sections yet remain valid obligations. For
instance it is possible to destroy the negotiability of a promissory note
by making alterations in its provisions. But as the supreme court
pointed out,33 that does not render the note invalid. And though most
checks are negotiable instruments it is possible for a check not to be
negotiable, yet be enforceable.3a And even though the U.C.C. permits a
bank to refuse to pay a check six months old, the instrument does not
30. Id. at 82, 450 S.W.2d at 302-02.
31. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-104 (1961) provides in part: "(1) Any writing to be a negotiable
instrument within this Article [chapter] must
(b) contain an unconditional promise . . . to pay a sum certain in money and no other promise
.. .given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article [chapter];... "
§ 85-3-413(2) referring to the contract of the drawer of a check provides: "The drawer engages
that upon dishonor of the draft and any necessary notice of dishonor or protest he will pay the
amount of the draft to the holder or to any indorser who takes it up.
§ 85-3-414(1) referring to the contract of an indorser provides:
Unless the indorsement otherwise specifics (as by such words as "without recourse")
every indorser engages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice of dishonor and
protest he will pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his indorsement
to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who takes it up, even though the indorser
who takes it up was not obligated to do so.
32. Ladd v. Ladd, 265 Ark. 725, 730, 580 S.W.2d 696, 699 (1979).
33. Winkle v. Grand Nat'l Bank, 267 Ark. 123, 601 S.W.2d 559 (1980). See also Parker v.
Pledger, 269 Ark. 925, 601 S.W.2d 97 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
34. Mayes v. State, 264 Ark. 238, 571 S.W.2d 420 (1978).
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thereby become a nullity.86 The note and the checks in those cases were
still contracts to pay money, obligations of the makers and the drawers.
Another reminder of the contract nature of a negotiable instru-
ment appears when a court holds that the terms of an instrument may
be modified by any other written agreement executed as part of the
same transaction. 6 This holding shows how to determine the total con-
tract of the parties.37 And it is not unusual to find a case where a party
is liable for the amount of a note even though not on the note.3 8
B. Property
Cases have also been concerned with the "property" nature of ne-
gotiable instruments. The instruments may be owned and transferred
the same as other property.3 9 If an instrument is negotiable, it may be
sold and transferred so that certain bona fide purchasers of it may
qualify as holders in due course. A holder in due course has a title to
the instrument superior to the title of a former owner who was de-
frauded out of the instrument or whose loss of it was due to a breach of
trust.40 And if the instrument is a bearer instrument, the holder in due
course has a title superior even to that of a former owner from whom
the instrument was stolen or by whom it was lost. The holder in due
course need not repay a maker or drawee who, in discharging the in-
strument, paid him by mistake,"1 unless the holder in due course
35. Hartsook v. Owens, 236 Ark. 790, 370 S.W.2d 69 (1963).
36. Textron, Inc. v. Whitener, 249 Ark. 57, 458 S.W.2d 367 (1970); Guaranty Financial
Corp. v. Harden, 242 Ark. 779, 416 S.W.2d 287 (1967).
37. Guaranty Financial Corp. v. James Harden, 242 Ark. 779, 416 S.W.2d 287 (1967).
38. Mid-South Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Ft. Smith, 241 Ark. 935, 410 S.W.2d 873
(1967). This would also be true of a person liable for breach of warranty under ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 85-3-417 (1961 ) in spite of the fact that he did not indorse the instrument. That section does not
require a signature for liability to a payor or to a transferee. Of course, there are those who argue
that a cause of action for breach of warranty is not for breach of contract but is a hybrid. Such
purists may ignore the reference to the Code section, then, but not to Mid-South.
39. There may be a tenancy by the entirety in a promissory note. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 259
Ark. 16, 531 S.W.2d 28 (1975).
40. Nicklaus v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., Russellville, Ark., 258 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ark.
1965). ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-305 (1961) provides in part: "To the extent that a holder is a
holder in due course he takes the instrument free from (1) all claims to it on the part of any
person. .. ."
41. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-418 (1961) provides:
Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the Article on Bank Deposits and
Collections (Article 4 [§§ 85-4-101 ]) and except for liability for breach of warranty on
presentment under the preceding section, payment or acceptance of any instrument is
final in favor of a holder in due course, or a person who has in good faith changed his
position in reliance on the payment.
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breaches a warranty in being paid4 or owes the payor a duty through
the payor's subrogation rights.4" And if he "acts in good faith" the
holder in due course is excused from liability under two of the warran-
ties which he would otherwise give to payors." But most often the ben-
efit realized by a holder in due course is his right to be paid by an
obligor whose only defense to payment is one classified as a personal
defense.
4 5
42. The warranties are provided for by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-417(1) (1961) which reads
as follows:
Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior transferor warrants to a
person who in good faith pays or accepts that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain payment or
acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title; and
(b) he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is unauthorized,
except that this warranty is not given by a holder in due course acting in good faith
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature, whether or not the
drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to an acceptor of a draft if the holder in due course took the draft after the
acceptance or obtained the acceptance without knowledge that the drawer's signa-
ture Was unauthorized; and
(c) the instrument has not been materially altered, except that this warranty is not
given by a holder in due course acting in good faith
(i) to the maker of a note; or
(ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration made prior to the accept-
ance if the holder in due course took the draft after the acceptance, even though the
acceptance provided "payable as originally drawn" or equivalent terms; or
(iv) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration made after the
acceptance.
Under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-207(1) (1961) the same warranties are given to payor banks and
other payors when payment is obtained through the bank collection system.
43. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-407 (1961) provides in part:
If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of the drawer or maker
or otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for objection by the drawer or maker,
to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent necessary to prevent loss to the
bank by reason of its payment of the item, the payor bank shall be subrogated to the
rights
(c) of the drawer or maker against the payee or any other holder of the item with
respect to the transaction out of which the item arose.
Such a right (to repayment) would exist against a holder in due course where the drawer had a
real defense. This could happen, for instance, where a check was drawn as part of an illegal
transaction. For other such defenses see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-305(2) (1961).
44. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-417(l)(b) and (c) (1961): supra note 42.
45. Id. § 85-3-305(2) provides:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument free from
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt
except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
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C. Defenses
The personal defenses are the usual ones that might be asserted in
a breach of contract case such as fraud, breach of warranty, want of or
failure of (or partial failure of)46 consideration, or non-performance of
a condition precedent. A holder in due course will ordinarily take the
instrument free of the defense of discharge (except discharge in insol-
vency proceedings), but he will not if he has notice of the discharge
when he takes the instrument. 47 Nor will he take free of real defenses.48
These are defenses such as incapacity, illegality, and duress if they
cause a contract to be void. 49 Real defenses reflect the state's view that
the contract is disapproved of so much that nobody should be able to
enforce it. As alluded to above, discharge in bankruptcy is a real de-
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as renders the obli-
gation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with neither
knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essen-
tial terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the instrument.
§ 85-3-306 provides:
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the instrument
subject to
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an action on a simple con-
tract; and
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-performance of any condition
precedent, nondelivery, or delivery for a special purpose (Section 3-408 [§ 85-3-408];
and
(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the instrument acquired it
by theft, or that payment or satisfaction to such holder would be inconsistent with the
terms of a restrictive indorsement. The claim of any third person to the instrument is
not otherwise available as a defense to any party liable thereon unless the third person
himself defends the action for such party.
§ 85-3-408 reiterates § 85-3-306(c), in its first sentence:
Want or failure of consideration is a defense as against any person not having the rights
of a holder in due course (Section 3-305 [§ 85-3-3051), except that no consideration is
necessary for an instrument or obligation thereon given in payment of or as security for
an antecedent obligation of any kind. Nothing in this section shall be taken to displace
any statute outside this Act under which a promise is enforceable notwithstanding lack
or failure of consideration. Partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto
whether or not the failure is in an ascertained or liquidated amount.
46. Farmers Co-Op Ass'n Inc. v. Garrison, 248 Ark. 948, 454 S.W.2d 644 (1970). See also
the last sentence of § 85-3-408, supra note 44.
47. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-305(2)(e) (1961), supra note 45.
48. Id. § 85-3-305(2)(a) through (d), supra note 45.
49. Rauch v. First National Bank, 244 Ark. 941, 428 S.W.2d 89 (1968) (gambling); Pacific
National Bank v. Hernreich, 240 Ark. 114, 398 S.W.2d 221 (1966) (violation of the Wingo Act,
forbidding enforcement of contracts made by non-domesticated foreign corporations).
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fense as is forgery50 of the apparent obligor's name. Unless a party is
precluded from asserting real defenses"' they are good against every-
body, even holders in due course.
D. The Holder in Due Course
To be a holder in due course, one must have a negotiable instru-
ment and he must be a holder of it. 52 This means that it must have
been negotiated to him.53 Also he must have taken it "for value,5' and
in good faith 55 and without notice56 that it is overdue or has been dis-
50. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-401(l) (1961), supra note 21. § 85-3-404(1) provides: "Any
unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he
ratifies it or is precluded from denying it; but it operates as the signature of the unauthorized
signer in favor of any person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for value.
51. Starkey Construction, Inc. v. Elcon, Inc., 248 Ark. 958, 457 S.W.2d 509 (1970). ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 85-3-405 (1961) provides for the preclusion of a person who has been tricked by an
imposter or is the victim of a dishonest employee who procures the issuance of instruments in
certain ways. § 85-3-406 provides for the preclusion of a person who has been negligent.
52. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-302(1); § 85-1-201(20); § 85-3-102(1)(e) (1961).
53. Id. § 85-3-202(t).
54. Byrd v. Security Bank, 250 Ark. 214, 217, 464 S.W.2d 578, 580 (1971); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 85-3-303 (1961) provides:
A holder takes the instrument for value
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed or that he acquires a
security interest in or a lien on the instrument otherwise than by legal process; or
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for an antecedent claim
against any person whether or not the claim is due; or
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an irrevocable commitment to
a third person.
55. The requirement of good faith is set out several times to cover transactions involving
commercial paper. The holder in due course is required to purchase the instrument in good faith.
§ 85-3-302(I)(b). This must meet only a subjective test of "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." In addition there is a requirement to act in good faith under § 85-1-203
which provides that "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement." He may not have any performance required of him since he has
usually performed under any (prior) contract that he had-as say a promise to lend money or buy
the instrument. Rather he is due a performance by the debtor-drawer (or maker). But he would
be involved in enforcement of the contract to pay. Professor Farnsworth differentiates between the
two uses of good faith in his article, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 666 (1962). The first use-that of §85-
3-302(l)(b) is, he points out, "to describe a state of mind: A party is advantaged only if he acted
with innocent ignorance or lack of suspicion" Id. at 668. The second use-that of §85-1-303 is "to
describe performance or enforcement rather than purchase. In this sense 'good faith' has nothing
to do with state of mind with innocence, suspicion, or notice. Here the inquiry goes to decency,
fairness or reasonableness in performance or enforcement. This sense of the term may be charac-
terized as *good faith performance' to distinguish it from 'good faith purchase' and is the sense in
which 'good faith' is used in the general obligation of good faith." Id. at 668. The test to see if
there is good faith in the first sense is a subjective one. But "common sense and tradition dictate
an objective standard for good faith performance." Id. at 672. These can serve as points of refer-
ence as we examine the uses of "good faith" in Article 3. The good faith required by § 85-3-
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302(l)(b) comes at the formation or execution stage of the debtor's contract. The first or subjec-
tive good faith is also that which is required when paying money for an instrument subsequently
enforced against a forger (Q 85-3-404(1), supra, note 50) and taking a check (not postdated) in a
way that does not discharge a surety (Q 85-3-802, infra note 133). At the performance stage (of
the debtor's performance or the performance of a payor acting in behalf of the debtor, which may
be the enforcement of their duty by the holder, unless "enforcement" is limited to that in a court
of law) the holder in due course is specifically required to act in good faith when presenting a
forged or altered instrument (by § 85-3-417, supra note 42), presenting an instrument for pay-
ment when the instrument is forged or when there are not sufficient funds in the debtor's account
with the payor (Q 85-3-418, supra note 41), or dating an undated acceptance § 85-3-410(3). And
this must refer to the subjective good faith. The holder should not have notice of problems. But
this is similar to an innocent warehouseman delivering goods to a thief, which Farnsworth classi-
fies as a "good faith purchase" situation. Id.at 668. And subjective good faith can be required in a
performance situation, as when accelerating payment under § 85-1-208. Id. at 672, n. 33. Subjec-
tive good faith is required of the opposite party (who pays or satisfies a holder) under § 85-3-
603(1)(a) where there is payment following a theft of the instrument. However, although payment
is the performance of duty and for some purposes must be distinguished from purchase, on this
occasion they are alike in that money is being transferred and the state of mind of the transferor
is important. Nevertheless, in two instances there is a requirement of more than just good faith.
Both § 85-3-406 and § 85-3-419(3) require in addition that the action (or performance) be in
accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the actor's (or performer's) business. The
former governs the good faith of a payor (not a holder) in paying an instrument containing a
material alteration where someone's negligence contributed to the alteration. The latter governs
the good faith of a representative (who may have been a holder) who has dealt with an instrument
or its proceeds on behalf of someone who was not the true owner. And § 85-3-418 in governing the
change of position of a person not a holder in due course, following payment of an instrument
(supra note 41) seems to deal with subjective good faith conduct after the performance of the
contract. But that is from the standpoint of the person being paid and the person paying. If the
payment overdraws an account there was performance of a contract. But if the payment is of a
forged instrument, from the standpoint of those omnisciently looking at the facts as they really
are, and from the standpoint of the drafters, the "performance" is of a non-existent contract.
Although the good faith at the time of the purchase of the instrument is subjective, Mid-Conti-
nent National Bank v. Bank of Independence, 523 S.W.2d 569, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1286 (Mo. App.
1975) held that willful ignorance prompted by a desire not to know the true facts negated good
faith.
56. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-304 (1961) provides:
(I) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of forgery or alteration,
or is otherwise so irregular as to call into question its validity, terms or ownership or to
create an ambiguity as to the party to pay; or
(b) the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any party is voidable in whole or in
part, or that all parties have been discharged.
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument when he has knowledge
that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as security for his own
debt or in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of duty.
(3) The purchaser has notice that an instrument is overdue if he has reason to know
(a) that any part of the principal amount is overdue or that there is an uncured default
in payment of another instrument of the same series; or
(b) that acceleration of the instrument has been made; or
(c) that he is taking a demand instrument after demand has been made or more than a
reasonable length of time after its issue. A reasonable time for a check drawn and
payable within the states and territories of the United States and the District of Colum-
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honored, or of any defense, or claim to it on the part of any person."5 7
The Arkansas Supreme Court dealt with one routine case concerning
the meaning of notice. 58 Citing section 3-304(4)(d), it held that knowl-
edge that a promissory note had been given to a payee while the instru-
ment was incomplete59 was not notice to a purchaser that a claim or
defense to the note existed; and so the purchaser could be a holder in
bia is presumed to be thirty [30] days.
(4) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the purchaser notice of a
defense or claim
(a) that the instrument is antedated or postdated;
(b) that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory promise or accompanied
by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser has notice that a defense or claim has
arisen from the term thereof;
(c) that any party has signed for accommodation;
(d) than an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless the purchaser has notice
of any improper completion;
(e) that any person negotiating the instrument is or was a fiduciary;
(f) that there has been default in payment of interest on the instrument or in payment
of any other instrument, except one of the same series.
(5) The filing or recording of a document does not of itself constitute notice within the
provisions of this Article [chapter] to a person who would otherwise be a holder in due
course.
(6) To be effective notice must be received at such time and in such manner as to give a
reasonable opportunity to act on it.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-1-201(25), (26), and (27) provide:
(25) A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has
reason to know that it exists.
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual knowledge of it.
"Discover" or "learn" or a word or phrase of similar import refers to knowledge rather
than to reason to know. The time and circumstances under which a notice or notifica-
tion may cease to be effective are not determined by this Act.
(26) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or notification to another by taking such
steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary course whether or
not such other actually comes to know of it. A person "receives" a notice or notification
when
(a) it comes to his attention; or
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which the contract was made or
any any other place held out by him as the place for receipt of such communications.
(27) Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an organization is effec-
tive for a particular transaction from the time when it is brought to the attention of the
individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from the time when it would
have been brought to his attention if the organization had exercised due diligence.
57. Id. § 85-3-302 (1); Byrd v. Security Bank, 250 Ark. 214, 217, 464 S.W.2d 578, 580
(1971).
58. Cook v. Southern Credit Corp., 247 Ark. 981, 448 S.W.2d 634 (1970).
59. This is not inconsistent with Parker, 269 Ark. 925, 601 S.W.2d 897 since it can be
completed after receipt.
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due course. A federal court in Arkansas also dealt with a routine "no-
tice" question and held that knowledge of a bank officer operating in
his private capacity could not be imputed to the bank.60
E. Shelter and Reacquiring
Even if a person is not a holder in due course he can get the rights
of a holder in due course through the so-called "shelter" doctrine. To
encourage the sale of instruments in the hands of a holder in due
course (and thus not force him to sue to realize the money owed), the
U.C.C. provides that with two exceptions transferees from a holder in
due course get the rights of a holder in due course.61 Thus they get as
good a title to the instrument as the holder had and they take free of
the same defenses that he does. Among such transferees are former
holders who are referred to as "reacquirers."62 To see how reacquirers
may be sheltered, suppose P fraudulently induces D to make a note
payable to P. P then makes a gift of the note to I, an innocent taker. P
is, of course, not a holder in due course because of his fraud. He did
not take in good faith and he had notice of his own fraud. Nor is I
since I did not give value. So I would be subject to D"s defense against
P if I tried to collect from D. But 1, who still does not know of the
fraud, can negotiate it to H for value and under circumstances that
make H a holder in due course. But suppose that when H tries to col-
lect from D, D refuses claiming his personal defense of having been
defrauded. Rather than sue D, H then demands that I pay on his con-
tract of indorsement. When I pays H, the instrument is not dis-
charged,63 so I is better off than he was above and has the right to
collect from D. Since he was not a party to the fraud nor knew of the
defense when he sold the note to H, he got H's rights of a holder in due
course. So he can now collect from D, although he would not have been
60. City National Bank of Fort Smith, Arkansas v. Vanderboom, 290 F. Supp. 592 (W.D.
Ark., 1968).
61. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-201 (1961) provides in part:
(1) Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor has
therein, except that a transferee who has himself been a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting the instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or claim
against it cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder in due course.
(2) A transfer of a security interest in an instrument vests the foregoing rights in the
transferee to the extent of the interest transferred.
A fairly recent Arkansas case applied this doctrine. However it involved a note executed in 1959
and so was governed by the Negotiable Instruments Law as enacted in Arkansas. U.S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Wells, 246 Ark. 255, 437 S.W.2d 797 (1969).
62. K. & S. International, Inc. v. Howard, 249 Ark. 901, 462 S.W.2d 458 (1971).
63. Id; Griffith v. Griffith, 250 Ark. 845, 467 S.W.2d 737 (1971).
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able to if he had not negotiated the instrument to H.
F. Creating and Transferring Property, and the Influence of Death
Let us further examine the nature of the property right as it exists
in Arkansas, keeping in mind that the reason "property" exists in
choses in action is that the courts will enforce them. It may be con-
ceded that a promise which a court will not enforce may be of some
value, to the promisee. For instance, P may make a gift promise to his
son, and it will not be enforceable for lack of consideration. If, how-
ever, the father always keeps his promises, without resort to the court
action, the son will still consider the promise of value to him. But for
our purposes here we must consider the importance of enforceability. If
the law will enforce the promise, then it has value because there are
"property" rights in the promise.
It is misleading to say that a drawer of a draft or check or the
maker of a promissory note "transfers" property in an instrument when
he issues it to the payee. For one thing, a chose in action, if all other
efforts to collect fail, may be the subject of a suit against the obligor,
that is the drawer or maker. But persons do not sue themselves. So the
instrument is not property to a drawer or maker.6 For another thing, a
drawer of a check has a right to stop payment on it.6 5 And transferees
of instruments are "vested with" the rights of the transferors.66 By say-
ing that a drawer does not "transfer" a check we avoid giving payees
the right to control the stopping of payment.
Perhaps it is best to say that a drawer or maker "creates" property
or rights in the payee. But because contract law is interwoven with the
creation of this property (or these rights), the limitations of contract
rights must be considered. For example if X paint's Y's house as a gift,
the increase in value of Y's property is the same as if it had been paid
for. And this is a "created" increase; X did not "transfer" the more
valuable painted state of the house. But if X "creates" a negotiable
instrument and gives it to Y, Y does not have an instrument as valuable
as one paid for. Y has taken an instrument which is subject to the de-
fense of no consideration and which is thus unenforceable by him if X
decides he does not wish that it be paid.6 7 On the other hand, if X
64. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1,
-, 184 N.E. 2d 358, 360, I U.C.C. Rep. 195, 199, 99 A.L.R.2d 628, 633 (1962).
65. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-403 (1961).
66. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-201 (1961), supra note 61.




wishes that it be paid, the instrument is as valuable to Y as if it had
been bought. So until he presents the instrument for payment, Y may
not know what the true value is.
The way Y learns of the value or lack of it will depend on the
instrument. If it is a note Y will attempt to collect from X, and if X
decides that it is not to be paid, he will refuse to pay it. If the instru-
ment is a check and X decides that it is not to be paid, he will order the
bank to stop payment. But even if the bank stops payment, Y may still
try to collect from X after the dishonor. If X has a change of heart he
may pay. If not, Y can collect nothing. Thus, in the case of the check,
X may twice have to make the decision that it is not to be paid.
Of course property in X's instrument can be transferred after X
has issued it. An unqualified indorsement of the instrument by Y to Z
does two things: it "transfers" Y's property right to collect from X and
by contract "creates" in Z a new property right to collect from Y. To
see the significance of this, suppose that Y paid X value for the instru-
ment and was a holder in due course, but that Z took it from Y as a
gift. Z may enforce the instrument against X as Y's transferee but not
against Y if Y choses to use his defense of no consideration.
With those two examples let us turn to cases where X's intention
of paying (at the time of payment) is never known. These are cases
where X has died while his instrument, which was the subject of a gift,
is still unpaid. Because X has died, it cannot be known whether he
prefers payment or dishonor. The course that a court might take would
be to say that since the instrument was subject to the defense of no
consideration, it must hold that the "created" property rights should be
destroyed. That is, since no consideration was given, the instrument
does not have to be paid, it is not a good claim against the estate, and
the personal representative of the estate has a duty to resist the pay-
ment out of the assets of the estate. This would indicate a preference
for assuming that X would choose to refuse payment. On the other
hand, the court might presume that X would have paid it had he lived,
and thus it would order the personal representative to pay it. In issuing
this last order the court has increased the value of the instrument (and
because of the doctrine of precedent, other instruments in similar situa-
tions) from that which it would have in the first example above ("cre-
ated" property) to that which it would have in the second example
("transferred" property). The Arkansas court has chosen the second
course. It held to be enforceable several instruments which were issued
to payees as gifts by persons who died before payment, and it has let
the decision as to the payees' title depend upon whether or not the in-
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struments were bases of gifts causa mortis.°8 The background of this
rule is found in a series of cases, a few of which will be enough to show
the development of the idea.
In the first case, Hatcher v. Buford,69 the decedent had been made
the payee of notes which he gave to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
claiming title to the notes against the estate. This was not a suit on the
decedent's indorsement, so it was a question of "transferred" property.
Once this case was concluded, the winner (the plaintiff or the estate)
would collect from the maker of the notes, a living person. This type of
property was such that either way the court decided the value would be
the same.
A later case, Lowe v. Hart10 involved a certificate of deposit
owned by the decedent. Here the bank was in the same position as the
maker of the notes in Hatcher v. Buford. The donor was the payee of
the certificate and so similar to the payee of the notes. Thus this case
also involved "transferred" property. No claim was being brought
against the decedent on an obligation as the indorser. The money would
be collected from the bank, just as it would be from the maker in
Hatcher.
The third case, Carter v. Greenway7 1 involved checks drawn by
the decedent. However, after his death the payees cashed the checks
and purchased certificates of deposit. So there was no claim against the
estate based on obligations of the decedent. However, one of the coun-
sel had argued that a check could not be the basis of a gift causa mor-
tis, and the court responded by stating: "But we think that the better
reasoning and the trend of our own authorities, where the rights of
creditors are not involved, is that when the delivery of the check is
coupled with an intent to transfer a present interest in the money, and
no revocation is attempted, the intent of the donor should be given ef-
fect, and that the donee has the right to payment of the check after the
death of the drawer as well as before."'7 2 The case cited "Morse on
Banks and Banking (5-Ed.) vol. 2, par. 549, p. 198, to the effect that
.... 'In this peculiar case of a check . . . no one but the creditors of
the donor have [sic] a right to object. They have a superior equity to
the donee . . . . The rule that has grown up is a child of the error that
the drawer's death is a revocation of the bank's authority to pay his
68. Fendley v. Laster, 260 Ark. 370, 538 S.W.2d 555 (1976).
69. 60 Ark. 169, 29 S.W. 641, 27 L.R.A. 507 (1895).
70. 93 Ark. 548, 125 S.W. 1030 (1910).
71. 152 Ark. 339, 238 S.W. 65 (1922).
72. Id. at 347, 238 S.W at 67.
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checks, and should be banished with its parent. . . . And . . . the the-
ory that said personal representatives are identical with the deceased is
groundless; any action they may take against the donee profits, not the
deceased, but his heirs and legatees, and therefore the executor or ad-
ministrator in reality represents said heirs or legatees, and as against
them the donee has the superior equity .... .,,7- The court also cited
the Hatcher and Lowe cases.
The fourth case was Smith, Administratrix v. Clark.74 Here, as in
Carter, the decedent was the drawer of the checks and as in that case
the checks had been paid. So again the suit was not on the drawer's
contract. But the court cited Carter for the rule that a check could be
the subject of a gift causa mortis.
The case of Burks v. Burks,7 5 however, put the rule (which up to
then was dictum) to use and thereby avoided the defense of no consid-
eration. The decedent was the drawer of the checks in question. She
had given them to the payee. Because the drawer had died before they
were presented for payment, the bank refused to pay them. The court,
relying on Carter, held that the two checks "vested property rights in
the payee" (who was thus entitled to payment of money paid into court
by the bank). However, this was a case of "created" property. Had the
drawer been sued in her lifetime she would have had the defense of no
consideration and could have avoided paying. The revocation of the au-
thority of the bank to pay (because of death) is not the crucial issue,
contrary to what Morse implied. For had she issued a check which
through transfer came into the hands of a holder in due course, any
revocation of authority would have applied to that check also. But if
the drawee bank had dishonored it, the holder in due course would not
have been subject to the estate's personal defenses, including failure of
consideration. The estate could not have avoided paying after death
any more than the drawer could have before. This case then, admit-
tedly the minority rule, conferred on a donee-payee of a check special
property rights not found in most other states.
76
In Dailey v. Adams," however, the donee did not fare so well. The
decedent drew a check 140 days before her death, payable to him, and
left instructions that it was to be paid out of her estate. The court held
that it was neither a gift inter vivos, nor gift causa mortis. It also held
73. Id. at 347-49, 238 S.W. at 67-68.
74. 219 Ark. 751, 244 S.W.2d 776 (1952).
75. 222 Ark. 97, 257 S.W.2d 369, 38 A.L.R.2d 589 (1953).
76. Id. at 101, 257 S.W.2d at 371.
77. 229 Ark. 571, 319 S.W.2d 34 (1958).
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that the check was without consideration, and the claim against the
estate was disallowed.
These cases all arose before the U.C.C. came into effect. Under
section 4-405, upon the death of a drawer the drawee bank's authority
to pay a check is not revoked "until the bank knows of the fact of death
• . . and has reasonable opportunity to act on it." The implication is
that a short time after a member of the bank's personnel learns of a
drawer's death, the bank's authority to pay his check is revoked. That
is the rule described in the quotation from Morse (cited in Carter,
above) as "error." In a case decided after the Code was in effect, the
court was again concerned with a check drawn by the decedent. It held
that there was not an effective gift causa mortis, though it reaffirmed
that a check could be the subject of one."" However, it cited Smith,
Administratrix v. Clark and not Burks v. Burks. The court did not
discuss whether the rule should be reexamined in light of section 4-405.
III. CONCERNING LITIGATION
A. The Choice of Suit
One of the advantages of being the holder of a negotiable instru-
ment is that the Uniform Commercial Code has provisions to simplify
the pleading and procedure of a lawsuit for collection. So it would seem
that if a person is given a negotiable instrument to pay a debt and the
instrument is dishonored, the person would choose the easier course and
sue on the instrument rather than on the debt itself. But as the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court has pointed out, the U.C.C. provides that the credi-
tor may, if he chooses, sue on the underlying debt instead. 9 The debt is
not extinguished when the check is given; the check is not substituted
for it. Rather the debt is suspended, and if the instrument is dishonored
the creditor may choose how he will sue. This does not mean that the
amount owed him is doubled, however. Thus if the creditor sues upon
the debt instead of the instrument he must surrender the instrument in
court to be entitled to a judgment. This protects the defendant by
preventing the instrument's being negotiated to a holder in due
course.80 The form of pleading also protects the debtor from the instru-
ment's being further negotiated, for the instrument must be attached to
78. Fendley v. Laster, 260 Ark. 370, 538 S.W.2d 555 (1976).
79. Skelton v. Farm Service Co-operative, Inc. 266 Ark. 827, 587 S.W.2d 76 (1979), citing
and following ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-802(I)(b).
80. 266 Ark. at 830, 587 S.W.2d at 78.
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the pleading or its absence explained. 1
B. The Missing Instrument-Whom Do You Trust?
Sometimes a problem arises because the instrument is missing. Let
us consider what is done then. Suppose a client says to his attorney that
the instrument has been lost or perhaps unintentionally" destroyed.
The loss or destruction of an instrument does not destroy the cause of
action, but the owner is no longer the holder. 83 What should be done
and why?
1. Owning and Holding
To begin with, there is a distinction between being the owner of an
instrument and being a holder. Suppose that Otis, who is both owner
and the holder of a promissory note, tries upon its dishonor to collect
from Mayberry, the maker, but is unsuccessful. Otis then retains Cal-
vin, of Calvin and Associates, Collectors, to collect it for him. He in-
dorses the note to Calvin and delivers it to him. Otis is the owner but
no longer qualifies as the holder, since he neither possesses the instru-
ment nor is any longer the indorsee, because Calvin possesses it and is
the indorsee.84 Calvin is the holder since he fits the definition. As the
Arkansas court has pointed out, the holder need not be the owner.
85
Thus Mayberry can properly pay Calvin and be discharged from the
obligation to pay anybody (including Otis) on the instrument.86 If
Mayberry does not pay, Calvin as the holder of the instrument can-in
his own name-sue Mayberry. 7 But Calvin's rights on the instrument
do not determine ultimately the right to the money coming from May-
berry. Calvin has a contractual duty to pay Otis according to their
agreement. Otis was still the owner of the instrument (up until pay-
ment) since Calvin took it to collect it instead of buying it.
Suppose the instrument was lost before Otis could negotiate it to
Calvin. Again Otis ceases to be the holder because he is no longer in
81. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1143 (1979); A.R. Civ. P. 10 (c) and (d). For a somewhat confus-
ing case on this point, see Chaviers v. Simmons, 256 Ark. 731, 510 S.W.2d 301 (1974).
82. Intentional destruction can amount to discharge of the parties liable on the instrument.
See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-605 (1961).
83. A holder must be in possession of the instrument. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-1-201(20)
(1961). But see Bryan v. Bartlett, 435 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1970), supra note 6.
84. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-1-201 (20) (1961).
85. Chenowith v. Bank of Dardanelle, 243 Ark. 310, 419 S.W.2d 792 (1967).
86. Id.
87. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-307(2) (1961), infra note 90.
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possession. Who is the holder? No one, because no one fits the
definition.
Now return to the supposition above. The client "said" that the
instrument was lost. This may be true. But there are at least two other
possibilities. It may have been indorsed and given to one Ingrid. If so,
Ingrid is the holder. It may have been indorsed in blank and then lost.
If it was then found by Ingrid, Ingrid again is the holder. And Ingrid is
the person the debtor can safely pay-as Calvin was above. Whichever
of the possibilities is true, the Code provides a way both to allow Otis
to collect if the instrument is lost-so that the debtor does not go
free-and to protect against the possibilities that a holder in due course
has the instrument-so that the debtor need not pay twice (once in this
suit and again in a suit by a holder in due course such as Ingrid might
be).
88
2. A Change in Pleadings
Since the plaintiff is not the holder, he has a harder time with his
case than a holder has. He files his pleadings, of course without the
original instrument. But he should attach a copy of the instrument if
he has one. In this type of case not only must the plaintiff allege and
prove his ownership of the instrument, its terms, and the facts that
establish the defendant's liability, but he must also allege and prove the
facts that explain the absence of the instrument. As the Arkansas court
has pointed out, he is not entitled to a judgment if he does not explain
its absence.89 And to protect the debtor against paying twice, the court
may require the plaintiff to furnish security sufficient to indemnify the
defendant against loss if he has to pay a second time. This can not be
avoided by suing on the underlying debt instead, because, as pointed
out above, the plaintiff would have to surrender the instrument. He
cannot do that if he does not have it.
C. The Ordinary Suit-Pleadings and Evidence
Now let us return to the ordinary suit on an instrument. The
plaintiff, if a holder, enjoys certain presumptions. They are found in
88. id. § 85-3-804 provides:
The owner of an instrument which is lost, whether by destruction, theft or otherwise,
may maintain an action in his own name and recover from any party liable thereon
upon due proof of his ownership, the facts which prevent his production of the instru-
ment and its terms. The court may require security indemnifying the defendant against
loss by reason of further claims on the instrument.
89. Chaviers v. Simmons, 256 Ark. 731, 510 S.W.2d 301 (1974).
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Uniform Commercial Code section 3-307,90 which first addresses the
effectiveness of signatures and the pleadings. If the effectiveness of a
signature is questioned because of lack of authorization or lack of
proper designation of representative capacity, another section, section
3-403, will govern. And the Arkansas court has discussed the proper
pleading needed to address that problem. 91 It decided a case where the
signature of the defendant was genuine, but the defendant wished to
avoid personal liability by claiming, first, that he had signed in a repre-
sentative capacity (as an employee of the obligor)" and, second, that
the payee had agreed that he would not be individually liable. How-
ever, the defendant pleaded this by using a general denial. The court
held that since the defendant would use testimony in confession and
avoidance to escape liability, a general denial was not the proper plead-
ing. Rather, the defendant should have informed the plaintiff of this
special defense by pleading the facts constituting such defense. And, as
an evidentiary matter in such cases, the burden is on the defendant to
prove that the payee agreed that he was not to be liable.9"
D. Deaf Before "Dishonor"**
Section 3-307 next concerns establishing defenses. In this connec-
tion suppose that the facts are as follows: Dan wrote a check payable to
Paul. An unknown person stole it from Paul, forged Paul's signature
90. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-307 (1961) provides:
(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings each signature on an instrument is
admitted. When the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue
(a) the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming under the signature; but
(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized except where the action is
to enforce the obligation of a purported signer who has died or become incompetent
before proof is required.
(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of the instrument enti-
tles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense.
(3) After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the rights of a holder in
due course has the burden of establishing that he or some person under whom he claims
is in all respects a holder in due course.
91. Chiles v. Mann & Mann, 240 Ark. 527, 400 S.W.2d 667 (1966).
92. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-403(2)(b) (1961) provides:
[An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument] except as
otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the in-
strument names the person represented but does not show that the representative signed
in a representative capacity, or if the instrument does not name the person represented
but does show that the representative signed in a representative capacity.
93. Fanning v. Hembree Oil Co., 245 Ark. 825, 434 S.W.2d 822 (1968).
** Actually this is a plea for a judge not to be deaf to the argument that "dishonor" is the
proper term to use. And the party arguing for the use of "dishonor" would be before the judge,
not the judge before the party. But the title scans better this way.
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and transferred it to Ingrid. Ingrid indorsed it and sold it to Harold
who deposited it for collection. Dan, the drawer, had been warned by
Paul, the payee, of the theft; so Dan notified the payor and payment
was refused. Harold has sued Ingrid and wishes to collect, claiming
that the check has been dishonored (and that a proper notice of dis-
honor as been sent). Should Harold win if he bases his suit on section
3-414? That section provides that an indorser promises to pay the in-
strument "upon dishonor."94 Ingrid defends claiming there was no "dis-
honor." The success of this claim will determine how the plaintiff must
prove his case. If she is correct, Harold must prove that Paul's signa-
ture was forged (and that there was a breach of warranty).95 If she is
not, he must prove only that the instrument was not paid and that he
promptly notified her.96 Consider how her argument might run.
To qualify as a dishonor under section 3-507 a refusal to pay must
occur when an instrument is duly presented and due payment is re-
fused.9 7 The requirement that it be duly presented is met by complying
with sections 3-503, 3-504, and 3-505.98 In brief these sections require
94. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-414(1) (1961) provides:
Unless the indorsement otherwise specifies (as by such words as "without recourse")
every indorser engages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice of dishonor and
protest he will pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his indorsement
to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who takes it up, even though the indorser
who takes it up was not obligated to do so.
95. See text at note 103, infra. This can involve the problem and cost of obtaining witnesses
qualified to testify as to the validity of the signature.
96. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-414(1), supra note 94.
97. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-507(l)(a) and (3) (1981) provides: "An instrument is dishon-
ored when
(a) a necessary or optional presentment is duly made and due acceptance or payment is refused or
cannot be obtained within the prescribed time or in case of bank collections the instrument is
seasonably returned by the midnight deadline (Section 4-301 [§ 85-4-301]); ...
(3) Return of an instrument for lack of proper indorsement is not dishonor."
98. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-503 (1961) provides:
Unless a different time is expressed in the instrument the time for any presentment is
determined as follows:
(a) where an instrument is payable at or a fixed period after a stated date any
presentment for acceptance must be made on before the date it is payable;
(b) where an instrument is payable after sight it must either be presented for ac-
ceptance or negotiated within a reasonable time after date or issue whichever is later;
(c) where an instrument shows the date on which it is payable presentment for
payment is due on that date;
(d) where an instrument is accelerated presentment for payment is due within a
reasonable time after the acceleration;
(e) with respect to the liability of any secondary party presentment for acceptance
or payment of any other instrument is due within a reasonable time after such party
becomes liable thereon.
(2) A reasonable time for presentment is determined by the nature of the instru-
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that the presentment by timely, at the right place, and following the
right procedure. It would be a weak argument to say that since an
instrument bearing a forged indorsement does not entitle the (wrong-
ful) possessor to payment, even though the possessor does not know of
the forgery, it should not be presented. And it would therefore be a
poor basis for concluding that when it is presented it is not duly
presented. But it is not a weak argument to say that in such a case the
payment which is refused is for purposes of section 3-507 not due. For
ment, any usage of banking or trade and the facts of the particular case. In the case of
an uncertified check which is drawn and payable within the United States and which is
not a draft drawn by a bank the following are presumed to be reasonable periods within
which to present for payment or to initiate bank collection:
(a) with respect to the liability of the drawer, thirty 130] days after date or issue
whichever is later; and
(b) with respect to the liability of an indorser, seven [7] days after his indorsement.
(3) Where any presentment is due on a day which is not a full business day for
either the person making presentment or the party to pay or accept, presentment is due
on the next following day which is a full business day for both parties.
(4) Presentment to be sufficient must be made at a reasonable hour, and if at a
bank during its banking day.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-504 (1961) provides:
(I) Presentment is a demand for acceptance or payment made upon the maker,
acceptor, drawee or other payor by or on behalf of the holder.
(2) Presentment may be made
(a) by mail, in which event the time of presentment is determined by the time of
receipt of the mail; or
(b) through a clearing house; or
(c) at the place of acceptance or payment specified in the instrument or if there be
none at the place of business or residence of the party to accept or pay. If neither the
party to accept or pay nor anyone authorized to act for him is present or accessible at
such place presentment is excused.
(3) It may be made
(a) to any one of two [2] or more makers, acceptors, drawees or other payors; or
(b) to any person who has authority to make or refuse the acceptance or payment.
(4) A draft accepted or a note made payable at a bank in the continental United
States must be presented at such bank.
(5) In the cases described in Section 4-210 [§ 85-4-210] presentment may be made
in the manner and with the result stated in that section.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-505 (1961) provides:
(I) The party to whom presentment is made may without dishonor require
(a) exhibition of the instrument; and
(b) reasonable identification of the person making presentment and evidence of his
authority to make it if made for another; and
(c) that the instrument be produced for acceptance or payment at a place specified
in it, or if there be none at any place reasonable in the circumstances; and
(d) a signed receipt on the instrument for any partial or full payment and its surren-
der upon full payment.
(2) Failure to comply with any such requirement invalidates the presentment but
the person presenting has a reasonable time in which to comply and the time for accept-
ance or payment runs from the time of compliance.
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surely the section refers to the person who presents the instrument. It
will not do to argue that payment was due (to the true owner and that
it does not matter that he was not demanding payment). Surely the
section means payment not "due to the one presenting." So Ingrid
could claim that since payment was not due, "due payment" was not
refused, and there has been no dishonor.
To go further, consider how Ingrid might conduct the case. Having
claimed a "dishonor" in his pleadings, Harold has attached the check
bearing the evidence of the dishonor. Under section 3-510(b) 99 this
may be "the purported stamp or writing of the drawee . ..on the
instrument or accompanying it stating that . . . payment has been re-
fused for reasons consistent with dishonor . . . ." But when Harold
tries to use the check (or other writing) which bears, as the reason for
refusal to pay, the word "Forgery," Ingrid claims that is not sufficient.
For according to Comment 2 to section 3-510 this reason is "not evi-
dence of dishonor, but of justifiable refusal to pay . "100 Further-
99. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-510 (1961) provides:
The following are admissible as evidence and create a presumption of dishonor and of
any notice of dishonor therein shown:
(a) a document regular in form as provided in the preceding section which purports
to be a protest;
(b) the purported stamp or writing of the drawee, payor bank or presenting bank on
the instrument or accompanying it stating that acceptance or payment has been refused
for reasons consistent with dishonor;
(c) any book or record of the drawee, payor bank, or any collecting bank kept in the
usual course of business which shows dishonor, even though there is no evidence of who
made the entry.
We may assume that Dan has written Paul (the true owner) a new check and they consider this
one a mere piece of paper. Or this "check" may be a copy. See the text following note 88, supra.
100. Comment 2 reads:
2. Paragraph (b) recognizes as the full equivalent of protest the stamp, ticket or
other writing of the drawee, payor or presenting bank. The drawee's statement that
payment is refused on account of insufficient funds always has been commercially ac-
ceptable as full proof of dishonor. It should be satisfactory evidence in any court. It is
therefore made admissible, and creates a presumption of dishonor. The provision applies
only where the stamp or writing states reasons for refusal which are consistent with
dishonor. Thus the following reasons for refusal are not evidence of dishonor, but of









On the other hand the following reasons are satisfactory evidence of dishonor, consis-
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more, assuming that the meaning of "dishonor" is consistent through-
out section 3-510, books and records could not be used instead to prove
dishonor, as provided for in (c), 10 1 because they too would only prove a
"justifiable refusal to pay."
Besides the wording of section 3-507(a) and the Comment to sec-
tion 3-510, Ingrid might find an argument in section 3-507(3)102 and
say that since the proper indorsement of the true owner was lacking,
the return of the instrument was not dishonor. It is submitted that the
court should reject all three arguments, because if it accepts any of
them an unnecessary problem arises.
If there has been no dishonor, Harold must resort to recovery
under the warranties of section 3-417(2)(a) and (b).10 3 These were
breached since under (b) the indorsement was forged and under (a) the
forgery prevented Ingrid from getting title. This means that Harold
must go to the extra trouble of proving the forgery. He would have to
do this if the instrument had been paid and the payor had demanded
and received repayment from its transferor. Then the parties prior to
the payor would be suing their transferors. In such a case, because of
the payment, there would have been no refusal to pay that could serve
as "dishonor." But the problem of proof should be avoided as unneces-
sary when there has been nonpayment. Surely it is desirable to desig-
nate the simple evidence of nonpayment as a "dishonor" and to let the
nonpayment establish Harold's case. Consider arguments counter to In-
grid's, beginning with the more involved argument.
The argument that "dishonor" should include "failure to pay be-
cause of forgery" could begin with the statement that the comment to
section 3-510 is not law and should be ignored. It is submitted that the
statement is a sound one. But for those who will not accept this answer,





101. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-510(c) (1961), supra note 99.
102. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-507(1)(a) and (3) (1961).
103. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-417(2)(a) and (b) (1961) provide:
(2) Any person who transfers an instrument and receives consideration warrants to
his transferee and if the transfer is by indorsement to any subsequent holder who takes
the instrument in good faith that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain payment or
acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title and the transfer is otherwise rightful;
and
(b) all signatures are genuine or authorized; . . ..
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one should argue that "forgery" is out of place among the list of rea-









Each of those reasons is apparent on examination of the instru-
ment. Harold and Ingrid have been put on notice not to try to collect
the instrument. Refusal to pay the instrument should have been ex-





These are matters not apparent to Harold or Ingrid. Nor is a
forged indorsement. Harold is not warned to hand the instrument back
to Ingrid as an undesirable one. Including forgery on the "dishonor"
list promotes a more orderly transfer of instruments. Classifying it as a
dishonor is not something that adds an extra burden to Ingrid. The
refusal to pay Harold because of a forgery would come as no more of a
surprise to Ingrid than a refusal to pay Harold under circumstances
that amount to a wrongful dishonor by the bank (as where there is an
error as to the balance in an account). Yet such a wrongful refusal is
as much a dishonor as a rightful refusal. And Ingrid would have to
repay Harold upon proper notice of such nonpayment.
The argument as to section 3-507(3) should be disposed of even
more easily. Surely this refers to a blank spot where a name should be,
not a forgery.
This then leaves only the problem of the word "due" in section 3-
507(1). To allow "dishonor" to be proved where either an indorsement
or a drawer's signature is forged, a court should hold that for this pur-
pose the word "due" includes the meaning "apparently due." This
would allow Harold to argue that there was a dishonor in this case,
though he could not argue this if payment was refused for any of the
seven other reasons listed in Comment 2 to section 3-510.
An unnecessary problem is avoided in the conduct of the case itself
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if the counter arguments are accepted. Imagine the following course of
procedure. Harold files his pleading with the check attached, claiming
dishonor. Ingrid moves to dismiss because the check itself, with "For-
gery" checked as the reason for nonpayment, shows that there has not
been a dishonor. The judge grants the motion, and Harold gives notice
that he will appeal the ruling. Harold also will have wisely included a
count charging breach of warranty for the forgery. (This will protect
him in case some defect in the notice of dishonor is found. Dishonor
and notice are not required for breach of warranty suits.) He then pro-
ceeds under the breach of warranty count because of forgery. But then
notice the situation. Suppose Harold does nothing after proving non-
payment. 0 4 Since the burden is on him to prove the forgery, the for-
gery is not proved. Does the judge then rule that there is no forgery? If
so, then does Harold move to have the judge change his ruling which
dismissed the count claiming dishonor? Surely if the reason there was
no dishonor was solely because there was a forgery, then if there was
no forgery, the refusal to pay means that there was a dishonor (insofar
as this is an issue in this suit between Harold and Ingrid). What we
have is a situation where neither party is interested in proving the for-
gery; certainly Ingrid is not for in so doing she proves herself liable for
breach of warranty. To avoid the problem that this presents and to save
the time and expense that proof of forgery would otherwise require, the
judge should deny the motion to dismiss, declaring that there was a
dishonor.
Two more points should be made if a court rules that the word
"dishonor" covers "refusal to pay a check bearing a forgery" when the
issue is raised in litigation. The ruling should also govern the duties of
an indorser under section 3-414 in determining that payment is due
before litigation is begun. Otherwise, the holder would have to litigate
for the indorser's payment to him to be rightful, a situation that should
be avoided. And, finally, this is not meant as an argument that forgery
should be classified as a "dishonor" instead of a breach of warranty; it
should be classified as both.
E. Defenses
We continue with the litigation process and with the question of
defenses under section 3-307. As pointed out earlier, defenses are clas-
sified as either real or personal. The defendant can prevail against any
104. This assumes that he needs to prove it in spite of the stamp on the instrument (or
writing) giving the reason for nonpayment.
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plaintiff if his defense is classified as a real defense. Such defenses are
listed in section 3-305.105 Although forgery is not listed there it is often
thought of as a real defense and is probably the one that occurs the
most often. It is not listed because the section refers to "defenses of any
party to the instrument" and one whose name is forged is not a party to
the instrument."' He did not sign it. There are two points brought out
in Arkansas cases which concern, first, absence of an authorized signa-
ture and, second, absence of any signature. As to the first point, the
Uniform Commercial Code specifically provides that an unauthorized
signature can be ratified.1 07 This could happen, for instance where a
person whose signature was unauthorized nevertheless received the pro-
ceeds of the instrument.10 8 As to the second point, though one whose
name is not on an instrument is not liable on it, he may still be liable
for the amount of the instrument. This may be established for instance
where a suit is being brought against people who are liable on a note,
and the party not on the note has assumed liability for payment by a
separate agreement. 0 9 Of course such a claim requires pleadings and
proof different from suits on an instrument. It would be treated as a
suit on an ordinary contract.
The real defense of infancy has been affected since the passage of
the Uniform Commercial Code, in that the Arkansas legislature de-
clared eighteen as the age of majority in 1975.110 Usury as a real de-
fense has been affected, in that the maximum lawful rate of interest
was changed by the passage of Amendment 60 to the Arkansas Consti-
tution in 1982.111
Certain illegal contracts are unenforceable as nullities. A negotia-
ble instrument executed to borrow money for gambling, for instance, is
"void. 1112 Thus the maker of a note so executed has a real defense. The
105. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-305 (1961), supra note 45.
106. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-401 (1961), supra note 21, and § 85-3-404, supra note 50.
107. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-404 (1961), supra note 50.
108. Starkey Construction, Inc. v. Elcon, Inc., 248 Ark. 958, 457 S.W.2d 509 (1970).
109. Mid-South Insurance Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith, 241 Ark. 935, 410 S.W.2d
873 (1967).
110. 1975 ARK. AcTS 892 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-103 [Supp. 1983]).
I11. ARK. CONST. amend. 60.
112. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1604 (1961) provides:
All judgments, conveyances, bonds, bills, notes, securities and contracts, where the con-
sideration or any part thereof is money or property won at any game or gambling de-
vice, or any bet, or wager whatever, or for money or property lent to be bet at any
gaming or gambling device, or at any sport or pastime whatever, shall be void.
This suffices to render the obligation a nullity as required by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-305(2)(b)
(1961), supra note 45.
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same is true of a note given by the loser to pay his gambling debt to the
winner. However, if the loser borrows money from a third party and
uses some of it to pay a gambling debts, this use will not render unen-
forceable a note given to the third party in return for the loan.1 '
The defendant whose defense is what is described as a personal
defense will prevail if the plaintiff is not a holder in due course. And he
will prevail over a holder in due course with whom. he has dealt. Per-
sonal defenses are listed in section 306.114
The personal defense of discharge occupies an unusual status
among the defenses in Article 3. Suppose Ingrid the payee of an instru-
ment has indorsed it over to Harold. Harold then discharges Ingrid
from liability on the instrument. Harold then sells the instrument to
Paul, a holder in due course, and informs him that Ingrid has been
discharged. Under section 3-305(2)(e) Paul takes the instrument sub-
ject to Ingrid's "defense" of discharge even though he is a holder in
due course (and takes free of any personal defense of the maker to the
instrument).115 But how can he be a holder in due course? Section 3-
302(1)(c) requires a holder in due course to take without notice "of
any defense, on the part of any person," and he has notice of Ingrid's
defense. One cannot find the answer in Section 3-304(4) which lists
several facts, knowledge of which is not notice of a defense. Discharge
is not listed." 6 The conclusion one reaches is either that section 3-
302(l)(c) does not really mean what it says or that discharge is a pecu-
liar kind of defense.
The effect of a fraudulent material alteration is to give a special
personal defense to any party whose contract is changed by the altera-
tion. This is because the alteration completely discharges the party as
against any party other than a holder in due course.1 7 Thus if X is
113. Rauch v. First National Bank, 244 Ark. 941, 428 S.W.2d 89 (1968).
114. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-306 (1961), supra note 45.
115. Id. § 85-3-305(2)(e) (1961; supra note 45.
116. Id. § 85-3-304(4)(1961), supra note 56.
117. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-407 (1961) provides:
(I) Any alteration of an instrument is material which changes the contract of any party
thereto in any respect, including any such change in
(a) the number or relations of the parties; or
(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than as authorized; or
(c) the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing any part of it.
(2) As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due course
(a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent and material discharges any party
whose contract is thereby changed unless that party assents or is precluded from assert-
ing the defense;
(b) no other alternation discharges any party and the instrument may be enforced ac-
cording to its original tenor, or as to incomplete instruments according to the authority
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given a check for six dollars and he raises it to sixty dollars he cannot
collect even the six dollars. However the alteration must be fraudulent
as well as material. So correcting a scrivener's error,118 for instance, or
changing the amount due on a note to reflect a premium for credit life
insurance requested after completion of the note, 19 will not discharge
the maker of the note.
Use of the defenses can result in penalties to innocent parties if
their transferors are insolvent. For instance, if after the fraudulent ma-
terial alteration above, X transferred the check to someone not a holder
in due course (say after the check was overdue or stale) that person
could not collect anything either, even though he had not even known
of the alteration.
The effect of a penalty can be further illustrated by Pacific Na-
tional Bank v. Hernreich, a case involving a type of illegality that was
a real defense. 20 Hernreich executed some promissory notes payable to
W. F. Sebel Co., Inc., a foreign corporation not qualified to do business
in Arkansas. The plaintiff, a California bank, was a holder in due
course; but the court denied recovery saying Hernreich had a real de-
fense (that Sebel was not qualified to do business). However, the opin-
ion had some weak spots. First, it was based on Arkansas Statutes An-
notated section 64-1202 (popularly known as the Wingo Act) which
provides that a foreign corporation which is not qualified to do business
"cannot make any contract in the State which can be enforced by it
either in law or in equity."'' And in applying the statute the court
cited an article by Dean Waterman 2 2 and a case123 on which the dean
relied in his article which held that under this statute notes payable to
unlicensed corporations cannot be collected by innocent parties to
whom the note is sold. However, both the article and the case appeared
given.
(3) A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce the instrument accord-
ing to its original tenor, and when an incomplete instrument has been complete, he may
enforce it as completed.
118. Shinn v. 1st Nat'l Bank of Hope, 270 Ark. 774, 606 S.W.2d 154 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
119. Winkle v. Grand Nat'l Bank, 267 Ark. 123, 601 S.W.2d 559 (1980). Note that the
court applied Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code in spite of the fact that the note was
found to be non-negotiable. This is permitted by § 85-3-805 where the reason for non-negotiability
is that the instrument "is not payable to order or to bearer." However, the reason for the non-
negotiability in Winkle was that there were "various errors, discrepancies and corrections." 267
Ark. at 134, 601 S.W.2d at 564.
120. 240 Ark. 114, 398 S.W.2d 221 (1966).
121. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202 (1980).
122. Waterman, Notes Payable to an Unlicensed Foreign Corporation, 5 U. OF ARK. LAW
SCHOOL BULL. 12 (1936).
123. Hogan v. Intertype Corp.. 136 Ark. 52, 206 S.W. 58 (1918).
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before the U.C.C. was enacted, and applied to the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law.
The second weak spot was the court's statement that "it is settled
law that assignees can receive no better rights than their assignors
had." 12 But the plaintiff was not a mere assignor but a holder in due
course, and a holder in due course can receive better rights that his
indorser had.
The third weakness appeared in a dissent by Justice McFaddin
who argued that the logical effect of adoption of the U.C.C. was to
allow holders in due course to recover on such notes. He pointed out
that prior cases had held the notes voidable and that under section 3-
305(2)(b) holders in due course can collect on voidable notes. 125 But he
made a doubtful and perhaps erroneous argument that such notes are
enforceable in federal courts if the jurisdictional amounts are great
enough.
126
Finally, the majority opinion stated, "To permit enforcement of
the notes would in effect repeal our statute. ' 12 7 But this is incorrect.
First, it would only have modified the statute since it would have left in
force its rule as to all contracts other than commercial paper, and even
as to commercial paper where there was no holder in due course. And
second, if the court had adopted the dissent's argument, any modifica-
tion could be attributed to the legislature itself in adopting the U.C.C.,
and not to the court; so the legislature would have repealed part of the
statute. The effect of the decision was to grant a windfall to the maker
of the notes who had done business with the corporation for two de-
cades, and to impose a penalty upon the innocent third party.
F. Not-Really-Weak Links in the Chain of Title
To return to a theme discussed earlier, let us at this point again
separate the contract characteristics of an instrument from the prop-
erty characteristics, and take notice of U.C.C. section 3-207.128 This
124. 240 Ark. at 117, 398 S.W.2d at 223.
125. 240 Ark. at 119-20, 398 S.W.2d at 224.
126. Id. at 119, 398 S.W.2d at 223. Wood v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949)
indicates that the federal courts would have to follow the Arkansas court. See also Pratt Labs.,
Inc. v. Teague, 160 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
127. Id. at 118, 398 S.W.2d at 223.
128. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-207 (1961) provides:
(I) Negotiation is effective to transfer the instrument although the negotiation is
(a) made by an infant, a corporation exceeding its powers, or any other person without
capacity; or
(b) obtained by fraud, duress or mistake of any kind; or
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section prevents an instrument, part of which is subject to a real de-
fense, from being a complete nullity. Just because a person has a de-
fense that would prevent his being liable on his indorsement, it does not
follow that he cannot negotiate an instrument and by that indorsement
give good title. Two examples will illustrate this. Suppose a parent exe-
cutes a check to her fifteen-year old child. The child indorses it over to
a third party holder in due course. If payment is stopped, the third
party will face the defense of infancy if he sues the child. But the in-
dorsement is sufficient to pass the title to the note so that the third
party can enforce it against the parent. Next suppose X gambles his
paycheck in a game of dice. He loses and indorses it over to the winner.
The winner can enforce the check against the employer, though he can-
not enforce it against the employee on the indorsement. 129
To return to Pacific National Bank v. Hernreich, if Hernreich had
loaned money to someone and had been the payee on the notes and had
then negotiated them to Sebel, Inc., would section 3-207 have allowed
Sebel to recover from Hernreich's borrower (the maker) though not
from Hernreich on his indorsement? It should, since section 3-207 is a
statute enacted after section 64-1202.
a13
IV. SURETYSHIP
Suretyship is defined as follows:
Suretyship is the relation which exists where one person has un-
dertaken an obligation and another person is also under an obligation
or other duty to the obligee, who is entitled to but one performance,
and as between the two who are bound, one rather than the other
should perform.131
The one who should perform is called the "principal" or "principal
(c) part of an illegal transaction; or
(d) made in breach of duty.
(2) Except as against a subsequent holder in due course such negotiation is in an appro-
priate case subject to rescission, the declaration of a constructive trust or any other
remedy permitted by law.
129. The rescission, constructive trust, and "'other remedy" mentioned in § 85-3-207(2) are
rights in the infant and the gambler, not defenses of the parent and the employer. Even these
rights do not affect a holder in due course, however.
130. This results from one of two assumptions. The first is that the court would say that
Hernreich made the contract (that the Sebel Co. is trying to enforce) with his borrower and that
the Sebel Co. is therefore not trying to enforce a contract that it (Sebel) made. The second is that
even if the Sebel Co. is viewed as trying to enforce an obligation as a result of a contract that it
made, the traditional rule is that the later statute (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-207, enacted in 1962)
prevails over the earlier one (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202, enacted in 1907 and amended in 1919).
131. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY, § 82 (1941).
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debtor;" the other party bound is called the "surety" and the obligee is
called the "creditor.' 1 32 In using abbreviations, the letters "P", "S",
and "C' respectively refer to the parties in illustrations below.
A. The Parties
Suretyship is not defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, but
section 1-103 authorizes resort to the common law for help in deter-
mining its relationship to and application.to commercial transactions. 33
Certain parties in Article 3 are types of sureties. An "indorser" who
does not indorse "without recourse" and who is not an "accommodated
party" is one.13 4 So are an "accommodation party"' 3 5 and a "guaran-
132. Id. comment a.
133. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-1-103 (1961) provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and eq-
uity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal
and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or
other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
The existence of a surety is recognized in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-802(2) (1961) which provides:
"The taking in good faith of a check which is not postdated does not of itself so extend the time on
the original obligation as to discharge a surety."
134. The contract which makes an indorser liable when another person fails to pay is found
in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-414 (1961), supra note 31. That section excludes those who indorse
"without recourse." An "accommodated party" is a principal and so is obviously not a surety.
After an indorser pays he may in turn use § 85-3-414 to collect from prior indorsers. To collect
from makers of notes and drawers of drafts and checks, he relies on § 85-3-413 which provides:
(1) The maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the instrument according to its
tenor at the time of his engagement or as completed pursuant to Section 3-115 [§85-3-
115] on incomplete instruments.
(2) the drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and any necessary notice of
dishonor or protest he will pay the amount of the draft to the holder or to any indorser
who takes it up. The drawer may disclaim this liability by drawing without recourse.
(3) By making, drawing or accepting the party admits as against all subsequent parties
including the drawee the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.
135. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-415 (1961) provides:
(I) An accommodation party is one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the
purpose of lending his name to another party to it.
(2) When the instrument has been taken for value before it is due the accommodation
party is liable in the capacity in which he has signed even though the taker knows of
the accommodation.
(3) As against a holder in due course and without notice of the accommodation oral
proof of the accommodation is not admissible to give the accommodation party the
benefit of discharges dependent on his character as such. In other cases the accommo-
dation character may be shown by oral proof.
(4) An indorsement which shows that it is not in the chain of title is notice of its
accommodation character.
(5) An accommodation party is not liable to the party accommodated, and if he pays
the instrument has a right of recourse on the instrument against such party.
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tor."136 The conditions precedent to the liability of these parties may
not be the same; but once the conditions are fulfilled, these sureties are
liable for another party's failure to pay an instrument.
An "accommodation indorser" is one who has not owned the in-
strument. He may appear to have been a holder (as where he indorses
after someone who indorses in blank-by signing only one's name) or
he may appear to be "anomalous" or "irregular" (as where he indorses
after an indorsement, other than a blank indorsement, that does not
transfer the instrument to him)1 37 but he was not a holder before in-
dorsing. Yet his suretyship duties are the same as regular indorsers.
Those duties are conditioned on presentment and dishonor of the in-
strument and proper notice of dishonor1 38 unless waived. 139 On the face
136. Id. § 85-3-416 provides:
85-3-416. Contract of guarantor.-(I) "Payment guaranteed" or equivalent words
added to a signature mean that the signer engages that if the instrument is not paid
when due he will pay it according to its tenor without resort by the holder to any other
party.
(2) "Collection guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signature mean that the
signer engages that if the instrument is not paid when due he will pay it according to its
tenor, but only after the holder has reduced his claim against the maker or acceptor to
judgment and execution has been returned unsatisfied, or after the maker or acceptor
has become insolvent or it is otherwise apparent that it is useless to proceed against
him.
(3) Words of guaranty which do not otherwise specify guarantee payment.
(4) No words of guaranty added to the signature of a sole maker or acceptor affect his
liability on the instrument. Such words added to the signature of one of two [2] or more
makers or acceptors create a presumption that the signature is for the accommodation
of the others.
(5) When words of guaranty are used presentment, notice of dishonor and protest are
not necessary to charge the user.
(6) Any guaranty written on the instrument is enforcible notwithstanding any statute of
frauds.
137. His status will sometimes be obvious. See § 85-3-415(4), supra note 135, concerning
notice to later takers of the instrument that such a person has signed it.
138. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 85-3-413(2)-414(1)(1961) supra note 31.
139. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-511 (1961) provides:
(I) Delay in presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is excused when the party is
without notice that it is due or when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond his
control and he exercises reasonable diligence after the cause of the delay ceases to
operate.
(2) Presentment or notice or protest as the case may be is entirely excused when
(a) the party to be charged has waived it expressly or by implication either before or
after it is due; or
(b) such party has himself dishonored the instrument or has countermanded payment or
otherwise has no reason to expect or right to require that the instrument be accepted or
paid; or
(c) by reasonable diligence the presentment or protest cannot be made or the notice
given.
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of an instrument it may be impossible to tell an "accommodation
maker" from a maker who is a principal debtor. But when the accom-
modation maker is sued by a person other than a holder in due course
without notice of his status, he may introduce oral evidence to prove
that he is a surety and be entitled to defenses based on his suretyship
status.40
B. The Problem Areas
Generally the problems of suretyship arise in answering one of
three questions: Is there a suretyship relationship? What defenses may
a surety assert? What remedies does a surety have when the time
comes for payment of the principal's debt?
1. Establishing the Relationship
The Arkansas court has addressed itself to the first question sev-
eral times. In Riegler v. Riegler,1" a case arising a few years after the
U.C.C. became effective, a wife who had signed a note along with her
husband claimed to be an accommodation maker. The note was for a
loan of money to build their house. The court distinguished between
her receiving a benefit from the note and receiving a benefit for the use
of her name. One who receives a benefit from the note is not an accom-
modation party but a principal. Mrs. Reigler received a benefit from
the note since the money was used to build her house.1 42 If, however,
she had simply been paid money by her husband for signing the note
that would have been payment for the use of her name. In such a case
she would have been an accommodation party so long as she did not
receive any benefits from the note.
(3) Presentment is also entirely excused when
(a) the maker, acceptor or drawee of any instrument except a documentary draft is
dead or in insolvency proceedings instituted after the issue of the instrument; or
(b) acceptance or payment is refused but not for want of proper presentment.
(4) Where a draft has been dishonored by non-acceptance a later presentment for pay-
ment and any notice of dishonor and protest for nonpayment are excused. unless in the
meantime the instrument has been accepted.
(5) A waiver of protest is also a waiver of presentment and of notice of dishonor even
though protest is not required.
(6) Where a waiver of presentment or notice of protest is embodied in the instrument
itself it is binding upon all parties; but where it is written above the signature of an
indorser it binds him only.
Claims of waiver are probably based on (6) more than on any other subsection.
140. Id. § 85-3-415(3), supra note 135.
141. 244 Ark. 483, 426 S.W.2d 789 (1968).
142. For a set of facts that are similar but that give an opposite result, see infra note 195.
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Some accommodation parties receive no compensation for signing
instruments. They are uncompensated sureties.143 Those who are paid
to be sureties are in some ways treated differently from the uncompen-
sated sureties. 4 4 Usually compensated sureties perform services other
than being accommodation parties on commercial paper. They may, for
instance, issue bonds for the principal's performance and as a result
have to pay money when the principal defaults in that performance. A
contractor may fail to complete a building, so the company which is-
sued a performance bond will pay money to have it completed. An em-
ployee may abscond with the employer's money and the bonding com-
pany will reimburse the employer. Since compensated sureties are paid
to be sureties, they may find that courts do not treat them with the
same sympathy as uncompensated sureties. That is, the defenses to
payment available to compensated sureties may not be the same as
those available to uncompensated sureties. However, though accommo-
dation parties are often not paid, the court in Reigler left open the
possibility that the wife could have been paid yet still have been a
surety.
Other cases have examined the benefits that makers were to re-
ceive to determine whether those benefits came from the note or from
their signing. In one case, 145 the parties to a note were seven stockhold-
ers of a corporation and two people who were not stockholders. The
funds generated by the note were needed by the corporation to exercise
an option on property for a shopping center. The two makers who were
not stockholders would be benefitted only indirectly by the exercise of
the option: they would have received compensation for services if they
had arranged financing for the shopping center. These two were held to
be accommodation parties while the seven stockholders were held to be
principal debtors. In another case, 146 one of two stockholders in a cor-
poration signed a promissory note so that the corporation would be ex-
tended credit. He was held to be a principal debtor because his primary
purpose was to benefit his business interests.
2. Availability of Defenses
The second question, concerning the availability of defenses, has
143. They are also referred to as accommodation sureties. See L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP, 94 (1950).
144. See SIMPSON, supra note 143, 101-12; and RESTATEMENT § 82, supra note 131, com-
ment i.
145. Hanson v. Cheek, 251 Ark. 897, 475 S.W.2d 526 (1972).
146. Nelson v. Cotham, 268 Ark. 622, 595 S.W.2d 693 (Ark. App. 1980).
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two parts. First, which of the principal's defenses are also available to
the surety? Second, what defenses are available to the surety, on his
own, based on the relationship?
a. Availability of the Principal's Defenses
The defense of the principal which the surety most obviously can-
not assert is that of discharge in bankruptcy.147 Considering that one of
the main reasons for having a surety is to guard against the principal's
inability to pay, for a court to allow this defense would be to exhibit a
sense of humor few people in the commercial world would appreciate.
Another defense unavailable to the surety is lack of capacity.'48
Again, this is a potential defense of a principal that creditors guard
against by having sureties. There are two aspects of the defense worth
mentioning though they are now a part of legal history.
First, under Arkansas Statutes Annotated section 68-1601
(1979),149 a minor eighteen years of age or older could not rescind a
contract unless he made restitution of the property or the money re-
ceived by virtue of the contract. But if the minor made restitution, it is
possible that this changed the defense from one of infancy to one of
discharge. However, this question should no longer arise in Arkansas.
After the age of eighteen was made the age of majority, 150 the statute
was not amended to cover lower ages.
Second, again as a part of legal history, consider the unusual case
of a son nineteen years of age who was surety for his parent!"5 At the
time of the case the age of majority was twenty-one years. The son was
an accommodation maker on a note with his mother so that she could
buy an automobile. When sued, he tried to raise the defense of infancy.
He was held to be subject to the requirement of restitution of the prop-
erty. Yet the statute required restitution "of the property . . . received
by the infant .. ." Surely the property was received by the mother
147. In re Woerner, 19 B. R. 708 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982), citing BANKRUPTCY CODE OF
1978, II U.S.C.A. § 524(e) (1979).
148. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 532 (1980); L. SIMP-
SON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP, § 59 at 286-287 (1950); RESTATEMENT OF SECUR-
ITY § 125 (1941).
149. The text appears infra note 152. This has surely been repealed by implication through
the passage of 1975 ARK. ACTS 892, codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-103, lowering the age of
majority to eighteen.
150. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-103 (Supp. 1983).
151. Wheeless v. Eudora Bank, 256 Ark. 644, 509 S.W.2d 532 (1974).
152. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1601 (1979) provides:
In the case of a sale, contract to sell, conditional sale contract, or other contract to
which an infant 18 years of age or older is a party, such sale, contract to sell, condi-
[Vol. 7:523
ARKANSAS U.C.C.
and not the son, or the son would, under the rule in Riegler v. Rieg-
ler, 15 1 have been a principal debtor rather than an accommodation
party. An uncompensated surety receives no property or money and, if
able to raise his own defense of incapacity, should be able to do so
without making any sort of restitution. However, because of our 1975
statute, this too is a case which should not occur again.
As a general rule if the accommodated party (or principal) has a
personal defense good against the holder of an instrument, the accom-
modation party (or surety) gets the benefit of that defense. Thus if P
does not have to pay because he was defrauded, or never received the
consideration for his promise, or received a worthless product (breach
of warranty), or the instrument was altered, S does not have to pay
either.
16 4
Discharge in bankruptcy is a real defense, however. And real de-
fenses are ordinarily good even against holders in due course. But we
have seen that S must pay the holder although the bankrupt P need
not. May a surety assert other real defenses such as illegality (of the
kind that voids a contract),155 duress, or forgery if they are available to
the principal? Although no post-U.C.C. cases have appeared in Arkan-
sas involving this question, it would seem that an accommodation
maker should get the benefit of the first two defenses. Surely this is
true if suit is brought by the payee responsible for the duress or a party
to the illegality. These defenses arise because the state considers the
conduct so bad that it does not wish to have its courts available for the
enforcement of contracts which result from such conduct. But the
holder in due course was not a party to that conduct. Should the surety
be able to avoid paying him simply because the defense is real? Per-
haps the court would look to bankruptcy and incapacity cases for an
tional sale contract or other contract cannot be rescinded by the infant unless and until
such infant makes full restitution to the other party or parties to the sale, contract to
sell, conditional sale contract or other contract of the property and/or money received
by the infant from such other party or parties. Full restitution of property means that
the property must be returned in substantially the same condition as received; or if this
cannot be done, there must be returned the property plus a sum of money which equals
the difference between the fair market value of the property at this [the] time the sale,
contract to sell, conditional sale contract, or other contract was made and its fair mar-
ket value at the time of rescission; or if the property is no longer in the possession of the
infant, there must be returned a sum of money equal to its fair market value at time
the sale, contract to sell, conditional sale contract or other contract was made.
153. 244 Ark. 483, 426 S.W.2d 789 (1968).
154. The ability of the surety to assert the principal's personal defenses is discussed generally
in J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 148, at § 13-17 and in L. SIMPSON, supra note 148, in
56 at 278-82, §57 at 283, and §60 at 291.
155. Note the wording of § 34-1604 in note Il1, supra.
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analogy. The payee procures the surety's obligation so as to guard
against the contingency that bankruptcy or illegality will be raised. But
here the remote holder in due course does not take the instrument until
after the surety has signed; thus the surety did not sign to assuage the
remote holder's fears specifically. Furthermore, lenders foresee the de-
fenses of bankruptcy and infancy. Such defenses are common; they do
not involve culpability. Does the possibility of illegality or duress occur
to lenders?
A court might decide that the later holder in due course took the
instrument relying on the surety's obligation specifically, and foreseeing
the possibility of facing the defense of illegality or duress. In such a
case it might conclude that these two considerations outweigh the un-
desirability of allowing the lawsuit against the uncompensated surety.
Then again it may not. For a surety may expect to pay a bankrupt's or
an infant's debt, yet not expect to answer for someone else's illegality
or duress. The court could give more weight to that.
As to illegality and duress, what if S is an accommodation in-
dorser rather than an accommodation maker? The rule should be no
different. Under Negotiable Instruments Law section 66 every indorser
gave warranties that "the instrument was genuine" and "is at the time
of his indorsement valid and subsisting."1 56 However, under the U.C.C.
an accommodation indorser does not give any warranties since he
neither "transfers an instrument and receives consideration" nor
"transfers an item and receives settlement. 1' 57 Those terms refer to
156. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, Sec. 66 provided:
Every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in
due course:
I. The matters and things mentioned in subdivisions one, two, and three of the next
preceding section; and
2. That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting.
And, in addition, he engages that on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid, or
both, as the case may be, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the
necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the
holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it.
157. The words "transfers an instrument and receives consideration" are from the warranty
section, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-417(2), supra note 8. The words "transfers an item and receives
settlement" are from the section granting warranties to banks, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-207(2),
which provides in part:
Each customer and collecting bank who transfers an item and receives a settlement or
other consideration for its warrants to his transferee and to any subsequent collecting
bank who takes the item in good faith that
(a) he has a good title to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or acceptance on
behalf of one who has a good title and the transfer is otherwise rightful; and
(b) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(c) the item has not been materially altered; and
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sellers of the instrument, not to accommodation parties. And although
an accommodation indorser, as any other indorser, has a duty to pay
following presentment, dishonor, and any necessary notice, 158 this duty
should be interpreted in the same way as that of a maker. The maker
has a duty to pay without any such conditions precedent. But that duty
is governed by other statutes or by rules of law so that it is excused if
there is illegality or duress. The indorser's duty should be interpreted
the same way.
Forgery presents a problem all its own. The situation seems to
arise vary rarely. How likely is it that an accommodation party will
sign an instrument without checking to see whether or not his principal
is actually involved in the transaction? Who would be the forger? Per-
haps it would be the payee. Surely he could not recover. The possibility
of such forgeries seems remote; however, the defense of forgery did
arise in a recent case in Texas, Universal Metals & Machinery Inc. v.
Bohart .1' The court held that guarantors of payment were liable on a
forged promissory note, the court describing them as "primary abso-
lute, and unconditional obligors."16 This distinguishes their guaranties
from "guaranties of collection" which would not have rendered them
liable. '61 The guarantors were stockholders of the corporation which
was supposedly the maker of the note, and the signature that was
forged was that of the president of the corporation who was in Mexico.
Although the possibility of a surety's raising the principal's defense of
(d) no defense of any party is good against him; and
(e) he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding instituted with respect to the
maker or acceptor of [or] the drawer of an unaccepted item. In addition each customer
and collecting bank so transferring an item and receiving a settlement or other consid-
eration engages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice of dishonor and protest he
will take up the item.
An accommodation indorser is never a holder so he does not transfer the instrument. Nor does he
receive the consideration or the settlement. That money is received by his accommodated party.
158. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-414(1), supra note 31.
159. 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976).
160. Id. at 877.
161. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-416 (1961), supra note 136. Under (1) the guarantor's
duty arises when the instrument "is not paid when due." But under (2) the guarantor's duty does
not arise until "it is not paid" AND "the holder has reduced his claim against the maker or
acceptor to judgment" AND "execution has been returned unsatisfied" or "the maker or acceptor
has become insolvent" OR "it is otherwise apparent that it is useless to proceed against him." As
to the first guarantor, the court holds in Universal Metals that the reason for nonpayment is
immaterial; there is liability. As to the second, the court in its opinion reflects the view that the
reason for not reducing the claim to judgment is also immaterial. There was a condition precedent
and it was not fulfilled; so there is no liability. And as to its being "apparent that it is useless to
proceed," that must refer to wasting one's time in trying to collect from an insolvent, not in
wasting one's time trying to collect from one who claims that his name has been forged.
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forgery may seem remote, several writers have touched on the point.162
b. Availability of Defenses Based on the Relationship
(1) Two Theories
As to suretyship defenses available under Article 3, section 3-
6061'1 provides that a surety is discharged by certain acts which impair
his recourse against the principal' 64 (or other sureties against whom he
162. See, for instance, Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
77 YALE L.J. 833, 866 (1968), where the author cites three cases dated 1887, 1900, and 1925,
respectively; Murray, Accommodation Parties; A Potpourri of Problems, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV.
814, 815-817 (1968). For a thorough discussion of the availability to a surety of the real defenses
of the principal, see Wladis, U.C.C. Article 3 Suretyship and the Holder in due Course: Requiem
for the Good Samaritan, 70 GEo. L. J. 975 (1982).
163. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-606 (1961) provides:
(I) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that without such
party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue any person against
whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of recourse or agrees to
suspend the right to enforce against such person the instrument or collateral or other-
wise discharges such person, except that failure or delay in effecting any required pre-
sentment, protest or notice of dishonor with respect to any such person does not dis-
charge any party as to whom presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is effective or
unnecessary; or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf of the
party or any person against whom he has a right of recourse.
(2) By express reservation of rights against a party with a right of recourse the holder
preserves
(a) all his rights against such party as of the time when the instrument was originally
due; and
(b) the right of the party to pay the instrument as of that time; and
(c) all rights of such party to recourse against others.
164. His recourse is in equitable remedies usually known by the names exoneration, reim-
bursement, and subrogation. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-330 (1962) provides: "A surety may maintain
an action against his principal to compel him to discharge the debt or liability for which the surety
is bound, after the same has become due."
This is supplemental to the equitable remedy of exoneration. Rice v. Dorrian, 57 Ark. 541, 544-
45, 22 S.W. 213, 214 (1893).
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-336 provides:
When any bond, bill or note for the payment of money or delivery of property, shall not
be paid by the principal debtor, according to the tenor thereof, and such bond, bill or
note, or any part thereof, shall be paid by the security, the principal debtor shall refund
to the security the amount or value, with interest, thereon, at the rate of ten [10] per
centum per annum, from the time of such payment.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-337 provides:
When such payment by a security shall be made in money, such security may recover
the same with interest, in an action for so much money paid to the use of defendant,
and when payment is made in property, he may recover the value, with the interest, in
an action for so much property sold to the defendant.
These may supplement the remedy of reimbursement, but not that of subrogation. Asurety cannot
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has a right of recourse)' 65 or impair the collateral. The source of the
rule is in the common law, and the reasons for it are not clear. One
reason (or perhaps a rationalization that came after the rule) was that
it was a fair thing to do. If the surety was not compensated, this was an
obligation he assumed out of the "goodness of his heart." If he has to
pay the creditor he expects to get his money back from the principal or
from any collateral that secures the loan. It is unfair to imperil this
expectation to any extent by anything that lessens the chance of its
fulfillment, since the surety was so kindhearted. And so for the uncom-
pensated surety anything that increases his risk or that materially al-
ters the principal's obligation 66 releases him from any obligation on
the instrument. This is called the doctrine of strictissimi juris. If this is
the basis, the argument runs, then if a surety is compensated he should
not be totally discharged. He should be discharged only to the extent
that he has suffered a loss."87
Another theory used to justify releasing the surety runs as fol-
lows: 168 P, S, and C, entered into a contract. P and C modified the
contract-by releasing P or extending time for payment. To do this
they rescinded the original contract and entered into a new one. When
they rescinded the old contract everyone was discharged. When they
entered into the new contract S did not join them so he is not bound by
it. This was a novation, and it is basic contract law that one party (or
two parties, P and C) cannot force another (here S) into a novation.
be subrogated until he has paid the entire debt. McConnell v. Beattie, 34 Ark. 113, 115 (1879).
He can sue for reimbursement if he has paid only part of the debt. 34 Ark. at 116.
165. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-338 (1961) provides:
When there are two [2] or more securities in such bond, bill or note, and any of them
shall pay in money or property, more than his due proportion of the original demand,
such security may recover such excess in the same form of action as herein provided for
a security against the principal debtor.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-339 (1961) provides:
No such security shall be compelled in any such action as specified in the preceding
section, to pay more than his due proportion of the original demand, and when such
security shall have previously paid any part thereof, he shall be liable in such action to
pay only so much as the amount already paid by him falls short of his due proportion of
the original demand.
The right of the co-surety is recognized by implication in Rauch v. First National Bank, 244 Ark.
941, 428 S.W.2d 89 (1968), a case which allowed it to be waived by a guarantor's consent to the
release of another guarantor. It is also recognized in Halford v. Southern Capital Corp., 279 Ark.
261, 650 S.W.2d 580 (1983).
166. Inter-Sport, Inc. v. Wilson, 281 Ark. 56, 661 S.W.2d 367 (1983).
167. For a comparison between the construction of the contract of an accommodation surety
and that of a compensated surety, see L. SIMPSON, supra, note 143, at 94-112.
168. For a further discussion of this theory and that of release because of strictissimi juris,
see L. SIMPSON. supra note 143, at 296-300.
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The Arkansas Court of Appeals has indicated that it subscribes to this
theory, though not necessarily to the exclusion of the first one. 169 Note
two results that flow from it. First, theoretically at least, this rule
should apply to compensated sureties as well as uncompensated sureties
and release the former as well as the latter. Second, the surety is re-
leased even if his risk is not increased but is lessened so that he is even
better off than before.
The availability of the defenses can of course, be altered by con-
tract.17 0 In one Arkansas case, for example, a party to an instrument (a
guarantor) was liable because he had agreed to be so even if another
party against whom he had a right of recourse (another guarantor)
should be released.1 7 ' In a second case, a guarantor on notes was held
liable because he agreed that his liability was not to be affected or
impaired by the renewal of the notes.172
(2) Extension of Time and Discharge
There are two common methods by which the creditor increases
the surety's risk by impairing recourse against the principal or against
other co-sureties: extending time for payment and discharging the prin-
cipal (or any or all of the co-sureties). Both are grounds for discharging
a surety under section 3-606. As to the first, extending time for pay-
ment, the Arkansas Supreme Court has made clear that an extension
of time must be binding to discharge a party under section 3-606.171
The creditor must do more than just tell the principal he may have
more time to pay or simply forbear collection. The reasons can be ex-
plained under the strictissimi juris theory. When the debt is due, as
will be shown below, 74 the surety has several things he may do to pro-
tect himself. If the creditor merely delays collection or makes a promise
without receiving any consideration, the creditor is not bound by the
promise, but can change his mind and proceed to collect immediately;
thus his risk is not increased. So also can the surety take steps to pro-
tect himself immediately; thus his risk is not increased, If, however, the
creditor and the principal make a binding contract to extend the time
169. Brandon v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 6 Ark. Ct. App. II1, 639 S.W.2d 66 (1982).
170. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-606 (1961), supra note 163 begins: "The holder discharges any
party to the instrument to the extent that without such party's consent..." (emphasis supplied).
171. Rauch v. First National Bank, 244 Ark. 941, 428 S.W.2d 89 (1968).
172. Lee v. Vaughn 259 Ark. 424, 534 S.W.2d 221 (1976).
173. Glover v. National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 258 Ark. 771, 529 S.W.2d 333
(1975).
174. See the text infra at notes 204 and 217 through 222.
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for payment, the debt is no longer due at the original time. So the
surety cannot take steps to protect himself as originally provided. Since
there is a possibility that the principal's financial condition will worsen
before the new time for payment arises, this means that the surety's
risk of not being paid is increased. He may have to pay with less hope
of collecting from the principal.
Under the modification of the contract theory, if there is no bind-
ing agreement there is no new contract. But if there is a binding agree-
ment the earlier contract with the earlier time for payment is thereby
rescinded and the surety is released. When the principal and the credi-
tor made the contract with the new (extended) time for payment the
surety was not a party and so was not bound.17 5 Under this latter the-
ory the Arkansas Court of Appeals released a guarantor, following a
modification of a contract. However, the case, I.E. Moore v. First Na-
tional Bank of Hot Springs,1 76 did not involve a guarantor of a promis-
sory note; it involved a guarantor of a lease.
It is possible to look more favorably on the surety than Arkansas
does. Other jurisdictions have held that the surety is released even
though the extension of time is not binding.177 This result is reached by
reading section 3-606 closely. It provides that the holder discharges the
surety to the extent that the holder "agrees to suspend the right to
enforce .. .the instrument. 1 78 There is no provision that an "agree-
ment" be a binding contract. Indeed the definition of "agreement" in
section 1-201(l l)17 does not require that it have legal consequences.
This is contrasted with "contract" in section 1-201(11) which does
mean a "legal obligation."'8 0
Section 3-606(2)181 provides that the surety will not be discharged
if the holder, in discharging a party or extending time for payment,
175. Brandon v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 6 Ark. Ct. App. 1i1, 639 S.W.2d 66 (1982).
176. 3 Ark. Ct. App. 146, 623 S.W.2d 530 (1981).
177. Lee Federal Credit Union v. Gussie, 542 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1976).
178. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-606(l)(a) (1961), supra note 163.
179. Id. § 85-1-201(3) provides:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or
course of performance as provided in this Act (Sections 1-205 and 2-208 [§§85-1-205,
85-2-208]). Whether an agreement has legal consequences is determined by the provi-
sions of this Act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts (Section 1-103 [§85-1-
103]).
Compare "Contract".
180. Id. § 85-1-201(11) provides: "'Contract' means the total legal obligation which results
from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and any other applicable rules of law."
Compare "Agreement".
181. Id. § 85-3-606(2), supra note 163.
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resorts to "express reservation of rights." However, since the surety
must not have his risk increased, he may assert his rights and remedies
against the principal debtor as if there had been no discharge or exten-
sion of time. Thus there is the possibility that where the creditor
reserves his rights the surety can render ineffective an attempted dis-
charge or extension by the creditor.
(3) Impairment of Collateral
A third way to increase a surety's risk is to impair collateral. A
loan may be secured both by the contract of surety and by collateral in
the form of personal or real property. If there is a default and the
surety has to pay the creditor, the surety succeeds to the creditor's
rights and so has a right to use the collateral as a source of repayment
just as the creditor had. 182 So he expects the collateral to be available
to him in case the principal debtor cannot repay him. Unjustifiable im-
pairment of the collateral, that is anything that lessens its value, in-
creases the surety's risk and is a ground for discharging the surety; but
perhaps the surety should not depend too much on this rule. For one
thing "unjustifiable" may be interpreted so that the creditor will not
have to undertake "burdensome" acts.183 And the Arkansas Supreme
Court, in two cases decided before the U.C.C. was adopted, had re-
fused to grant a release of the sureties based on failure of the creditor
to foreclose mortgages. 1 Foreclosure is "burdensome." So are other
acts. And a creditor may be relieved of an act, though relief may be
described in other terms. For instance, in a recent case the court re-
fused to release a surety although the creditor had failed to take any
action when the principal debtor did not "deliver" the promised collat-
eral. 18' "Delivery" would have consisted of assigning accounts receive-
able, which required the rather simple act of the debtor's signing a
security agreement. The creditor had not pursued the matter when the
debtor did not deliver. The court said there was no collateral to impair,
and the surety was not discharged.
Once a security agreement, mortgage, or deed of trust has been
signed giving the creditor a security interest (using the term in a gen-
eral sense so as to cover both personal and real property) in collateral,
182. Even where there is no contract to this effect, this result follows from the surety's right
of subrogation upon paying the creditor.
183. See L. SIMPSON, supra note 143.
184. Thornton v. Bowie, 123 Ark. 463, 185 S.W. 793 (1916); Grisard v. Hinson, 50 Ark.
229, 6 S.W. 906 (1888).
185. Svetska v. First National Bank in Stuttgart, 269 Ark. 237, 604 S.W.2d 604 (1980).
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the creditor who wishes to protect his rights against later creditors will
perfect the interest by filing in a place of record. But suppose he does
not file properly and suppose the surety is called on to pay the debt. If
as a result of the failure by the creditor to perfect the interest, another
creditor (or a bankruptcy trustee) has priority as to the collateral to
what extent is the surety discharged? This question was answered by
the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Van Balen v. Peoples Bank & Trust
Co.18 The case is worthy of several observations.
The appellants (guarantors) argued that they should have been
completely discharged. But the court held that they would be dis-
charged only to the extent that they could prove that the collateral had
been impaired by the failure to file. The court pointed out that this has
been the rule of all cases decided under the U.C.C.. Judge Glaze in a
dissent joined by Judge Corbin argued that Arkansas case law has al-
ways favored guarantors. He further argued for a rule that was a com-
promise between strictissimi juris resulting in complete discharge and
discharge to the extent of provable loss. That rule, which appeared in a
recent New Jersey case, Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp.87 is that if the
factual situation is such that the surety can establish that he has been
prejudiced but is unable to establish the amount, he should be com-
pletely discharged. Judge Glaze pointed out that that was the situation
here. The rule would continue to be that if the facts are such that the
amount of loss can be proved, the surety should be discharged only to
that amount.
The argument is persuasive. For an example, it should not be hard
to prove the amount of loss in value of an automobile caused by failure
to perfect a security interest because it is not hard to find the value of
an automobile. But the collateral in Van Balen was several items of
property all of which would have to be located and assigned a value. 88
Judge Glaze thought that it was unrealistic to require the surety to do
this. Perhaps the appeal of his argument lies in the fact that it is not
"burdensome" to file mortgages and financing statements to protect
property, but evaluating that property sometimes will be burdensome.
And perhaps the courts could consider sureties' burdens too.
The court that decided the LE. Moore'89 case, and completely re-
leased the surety was the same one that decided the Van Balen case
186. 3 Ark. Ct. App. 243, 626 S.W.2d 205 (1981).
187. 74 N.J. 45, 376 A.2d 931 (1977).
188. The unperfected security interest covered furniture, fixtures, and equipment. The collat-
eral was in the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy.
189. 3 Ark. Ct. App. 146, 623 S.W.2d 530 (1981).
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and refused to release the surety. The cases can be distinguished, how-
ever. First, Van Balen is a case governed by the U.C.C. and I.E. Moore
is not; and it may be that the protection for sureties was meant to be
lessened by the passage of the U.C.C.. The words of section 3-606(1)
"The holder discharges any party . . . to the extent that . . ." indicate
an intent not to discharge a party completely. In other words, Van
Balen (unlike LE. Moore) involves statutory interpretation. But an an-
swer to that is that Langeveld was also a U.C.C. case, involving inter-
pretation of the same statute; and it presents another possible
interpretation.
The second distinction is that LE. Moore involved an alteration in
the terms of the original contract. This allows the court to use the the-
ory of "destruction-of-the-original-agreement-followed-by-a-new-con-
tract." But failure to perfect a security interest or indeed any impair-
ment of collateral is not the substitution of an agreement for one with
different terms, but rather concerns the manner of performance of the
original agreement. Thus, LE. Moore allowed a complete discharge be-
cause it considered the surety's obligation completely destroyed. But
Van Balen viewed the matter as enhancing the surety's risk, and the
question was measure of damages. This case was based on the first the-
ory of discharge above. 190 But if Arkansas has favored sureties in the
past using that theory would be no obstacle to favoring them now.
A third distinction is that one of the goals of the U.C.C. is uni-
formity. 91 And Van Balen, by adopting the interpretation of section 3-
606 that other state courts have also adopted, is a step toward that
goal. Yet adopting the Langeveld rule in exceptional cases, though
viewed in the short run as a step counter to uniformity, could be a
trend that other states will follow. Its facts can be distinguished from
those in prior cases; thus following it would promote uniformity if other
states distinguish those facts too.
Another case concerning the defense of impairment of collateral
was Rushton v. U.M. & M. Credit Corp. 92 Rushton had failed to
prove that he had signed the promissory note in question in a represen-
tative capacity and so was personally liable. The note was for equip-
ment and the parties stipulated that "Rushton and Newmark pur-
190. See the text following note 165, supra.
191. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-1-102 (1961) provides:
(1) This .%ct shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes
and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are ...
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
192. 245 Ark. 703, 434 S.W.2d 81 (1968).
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chased the equipment."19 s Under the rule of the Riegler 94 case,
Rushton might 95 not have qualified as an accommodation party. How-
ever, the court said that he might seek relief under section 3-606. The
creditor had failed to perfect its security interest in the equipment,
which was collateral for the loan. The creditor then sold the note to a
holder in due course. The lower court held that the collateral was not
unjustifiably impaired. On appeal the supreme court affirmed the re-
sult, but its reason was that Rushton could have filed under the Code
as well as the holder in due course.
This statement raises several questions. Was it not for the original
creditor, not the holder in due course, to file the proper papers? Did the
holder in due course know of the surety's accommodation status? If
not, any defense arising out of the failure to file would be at most the
defense of discharge which is a personal defense. And a holder in due
course takes free of personal defenses. 196 So the result would have been
correct on that ground also.
19 7
But the statement that the accommodation party as well as the
holder in due course could perfect his interest by filing should be ex-
amined for the way it might be interpreted as to future accommodation
parties and original creditors. If the suit had been brought by the origi-
nal creditor, surely the statement as a general rule would not be true.
For with certain exceptions, perfection of a security interest in personal
property is accomplished by filing a financing statement. 98 This must
193. 245 Ark. at 705, 434 S.W.2d at 82.
194. 244 Ark. 483, 426 S.W.2d 789 (1968).
195. But this is not always so. See, for example, comment 2 to § 85-3-415, in illustrating how
an accommodation party may receive compensation: "He may even receive it from the payee, as
where A and B buy goods and it is understood that A is to pay for all of them and that B is to
sign a note only as surety for A."
196. ARK, STAT. ANN. § 85-3-305 (1961), supra note 45.
197. For a similar observation, see J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, 529, 141 (2d ed. 1980).
198. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-302(1) and (2) (Supp. 1983) provide:
(I) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except the
following:
(a) a security interest in collateral in possession of the secured party under Section 9-
305 [§ 85-9-305];
(b) a security interest temporarily perfected in instruments or documents without deliv-
ery under Section 9-304 [§ 85-9-304] or in proceeds for a twenty-one (21) day period
under Section 9-306 [§ 85-9-306];
(c) a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a trust or a
decedent's estate;
(d) a purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but filing is required for a
motor vehicle required to be registered; and fixture filing is required for priority over
conflicting interests in fixtures to the extent provided in Section 9-313 [§ 85-9-313];
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be signed sometimes by the debtor and sometimes by the creditor, but
not by the surety.1 99 As a general rule the creditor will be a financial
institution with ample copies of financing statement forms and experi-
ence in completing and filing them. It has control over the debtor in a
way that should make it easy to get his signature on all needed papers.
The same will not be true of the usual uncompensated surety. So it is
easy to see why failure to file has been held to be impairment of collat-
eral. Failure to perfect (in any way) a security interest in an expensive
piece of equipment which results in loss to another who perfects instead
(or to a bankruptcy trustee) means the same loss in value as if the
creditor had negligently exposed the collateral to theft and it had been
stolen. The word "unjustifiably" can still protect the creditor who per-
fected but, because of an honest mistake of fact, did so in the wrong
place.
The moral for an accommodation party must be that he should
check to see that the creditor has taken and perfected a security inter-
est in the collateral. Ordinarily, failure on the creditor's part to perfect
by filing will have been through oversight, and notification by the ac-
commodation party should be enough to prompt the creditor to file.
The surety's treatment in the loss of collateral cases should be
compared to that in a 1976 case2 0 in which the guarantor of a note
was to be notified promptly if an installment of a note was past due
more than fifteen days. The note did not expressly state the conse-
quence of failure. When he was not notified, the supreme court ruled
that he was completely discharged, not just to the extent of his loss.
(e) an assignment of accounts which does not alone or in conjunction with other assign-
ments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the outstanding accounts of the
assignor;
(f) a security interest of a collecting bank (Section 4-208 [§ 85-4-208]) or arising under
the Article on Sales (see Section 9-313 [§ 85-9-113]) or covered in subsection (3) of
this section;
(g) an assignment for the benefit of all the creditors of the transferor, and subsequent
transfers by the assignee thereunder.
(2) If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest, no filing under this Article
[chapter] is required in order to continue the perfected status of the security interest
against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor.
199. Id. § 85-9-402(1) provides:
(1) A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the debtor and the se-
cured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the secured party from which
information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of
the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of
collateral.
200. Lee v. Vaughn, 259 Ark. 424, 534 S.W.2d 221 (1976).
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3. Rights and Duties at Time for Payment
a. Usual Procedures
Upon arrival of the due date of an instrument, the holder has a
right to collect from an accommodation maker. If the surety is a guar-
antor of payment the principal must first dishonor the instrument and
upon dishonor the creditor may proceed against the guarantor. 01 If the
surety is an indorser the creditor must present the instrument to the
principal, be refused payment, and give notice of this dishonor to the
indorser within a given time-unless these conditions precedent are
waived.20 2 Then he may proceed against the indorser. If the surety is a
guarantor of collection20 3 the creditor must have reduced his claim
against the principal to judgment and had the execution returned un-
satisfied (unless following through with the procedure is useless);20 4
then he may proceed against the guarantor.
A surety upon arrival of the due date can bring an action in exon-
eration against the principal, joining in the creditor, to get a judgment
compelling the principal to pay the debt.20 5 This remedy does not ap-
pear to have been used in the appellate cases in Arkansas following the
passage of the U.C.C.
One of the changes in statutory law which occurred a few years
after the U.C.C. went into effect in Arkansas involved another remedy
which the surety could pursue without first bringing exoneration or
paying the holder of the instrument. Under Arkansas Statutes Anno-
tated sections 34-333 and 34-334, (1962) the surety could by notice in
writing require the holder to bring suit against the principal debtor,
and if suit were not brought within thirty days and carried through "in
due diligence" the surety was discharged from liability. These were
frustrating rules. The purpose of having an accommodation maker (or
an indorser who waived dishonor and notice of dishonor) on a note is to
give the holder his option to proceed against either the accommodation
201. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-416(1) (1961), supra, note 136.
202. Id. § 85-3-414, supra, note 31.
203. Id. § 85-3-416(2), supra, note 136.
204. In Shamburger v. Union Bank of Benton, 8 Ark. Ct . App. 259, 650 S.W.2d 596
(1983), the court describes the obligation as a guaranty agreement without specifying whether it
is for payment or for collection. It does, however, state that under the agreement "Union Bank
should exhaust all legal remedies before seeking judgment against the guarantor." 8 Ark. Ct.
App. at 261, 650 S.W.2d at 597. So it must have been a guaranty of collection. Shamburger
claimed that the bank had 5,000 shares of stock as collateral and that it had never attempted to
sell it. There was uncontradicted evidence that the stock was worthless, and the court said that it
found no error in the trial judge's finding that the bank had exhausted all its legal efforts.
205. See supra note 164.
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party or the accommodated party. And the condition precedent to the
liability of a guarantor for payment is only dishonor by the principal,
not the bringing of a lawsuit. Thus these sections gave the surety a
remedy that defeated the creditor's purposes in many cases. They were
repealed in 1967.
b. "Tough" Tender, an Interruption
To continue with the surety's rights and remedies when the instru-
ment is due, suppose the surety elects to pay the instrument at the time
it is due and proceed against the principal. If the creditor refuses to
accept the payment, consider section 85-3-6042o6 which provides:
(1) Any party making tender of full payment to a holder when or
after it is due is discharged to the extent of all subsequent liability for
interest, costs and attorney's fees.
(2) The holder's refusal of such tender wholly discharges any party
who has a right of recourse against the party making the tender ...
Why would a creditor refuse tender in the first place? Perhaps
because he wanted to allow the principal more time to pay but did not
wish to bind himself by granting an extension of time to the principal
and reserving his rights against the surety. By not accepting the tender,
the creditor prevents the surety from getting rights to, in turn, collect
from the principal.
The concern here is with a possible implication from section 85-3-
604. The section does not expressly say that refusal of tender by the
surety also discharges the surety. Is there then an implication that he is
not thereby discharged? There is authority that at common law tender
by the surety did discharge him.10 7 Simpson explains the reason that
the surety's rights against the principal may be injured by the delay:
"He cannot sue the principal for reimbursement, because he has not
paid the debt, nor can he, for the same reason, sue the debtor in the
creditor's name. 20 8 The Restatement of Security section 116 reflects
this view in that it provides:
Tender of performance by either principal or surety discharges the
surety unless at the time of the tender the creditor reasonably believes
206. Little has been written concerning U.C.C. § 3-604. See comment, Tender of Payment
Under U.C.C. §, 3-604: A Forgotten Defense?, 39 OHIO STATE L.J. 833 (1978); D. WHALEN,
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 116 (1981).
207. O'Conor v. Morse, 112 Cal. 31, 44 P. 305, 53 Am. St. Rep. 155 (1896).
208. L. SIMPSON, supra note 143, at 392.
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that the surety is a principal."09
The situation here is significantly different from that covered by
the now-repealed sections 33-333 and 33-334. There the surety was dis-
charged by the creditor's failure to sue the principal if the surety noti-
fied him in writing to bring the suit when the note came due. The
surety thereby avoided an obligation that he had assumed, that he was
to be available to pay the debt on the day it was due. But in the tender
situation the surety is not only available to pay, he is even trying to
perform his obligation. In the first situation the surety was doing the
unexpected. In the second the creditor is doing the unexpected.
The situation is also different from tender by the principal. He
received a material benefit from the creditor and should not be dis-
charged and avoid payment on such a technicality as would result in
unjust enrichment. The principal can, after all, put the money in safe
interest-bearing securities or in an insured bank account and wait for
the creditor to change his mind. He is protected by subsection (1) of
section 85-3-604 from the creditor's earning more interest. His tender
redeems his collateral, and he is being held liable as he intended to be
from the beginning. But a surety whose tender is refused is in a differ-
ent position. If he puts his money in safe securities it may be available
when the creditor changes his mind, but his actions do not assure that
the principal's money-meant to reimburse him for any payment-will
also be available.
Since the consequences of the surety's tender will depend on the
interpretation of section 85-3-604, the possible interpretations need to
be considered. Consider how the discharge of the surety might have
been provided for. Section 85-3-604(1) could have added "and if he is
a party with a right of recourse against another he is wholly dis-
charged." Does the absence of such a clause from subsection (1) force
an implication that the surety is not discharged by tender? The com-
ment says that the subsection "states the generally accepted rule as to
the effect of tender."2 10 That may be a slender thread for those who
contend that the comments are not law. But to the extent that it indi-
cates the intent of the draftsmen, and considering the rule as stated by
Simpson and the Restatement, one can conclude that subsection (1) is
not meant by implication to forbid "wholly discharging" a tendering
surety.
What then of subsection (2)? It could have added "and wholly
209. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY, § 116 (1941).
210. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-604 comment 1.
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discharges a surety making the tender." Does the absence of such a
clause force an implication that the surety is not discharged by
tender?211 Not necessarily. It may have been that the discharge of the
surety in such a situation was so obvious to the draftsmen that they did
not think the rule needed to be included. The comment tells us that it
"rewords the original subsection 120(4). ' '212 That subsection dis-
charged a party "secondarily liable" on the instrument when there was
a tender by an accommodated party who was prior to the secondary
party. 13 Section 85-3-604(2) discharges a party by tender of an ac-
commodated party who is subsequent as well as by one who was prior.
Thus if the surety is an accommodation maker and the principal, or
accommodated party, is the payee-indorser (that is, subsequent), tender
of payment by the payee-indorser discharges the maker. This was not
covered by subsection 120(4). So the section was meant to extend fur-
ther protection to a surety, not limit the protection he then had. And in
the days of the N.I.L., when the more limited protection was in effect,
the surety was discharged by his own tender of payment.2 4
The failure to discharge a surety who tenders full payment to the
creditor can lead to a situation that is ludicrous. To see how this could
happen consider a loan secured by two co-sureties (Surety A and
Surety B) on an instrument. Suppose that either is liable to the creditor
for the full amount, and each is to be liable to the other, if the other
has to pay, for half the debt. That means that if either one has to pay
the full amount, he will have recourse against the other in an action for
contribution. 1 5 Now suppose that Surety A tenders full payment to the
creditor and the tender is refused. Since either co-surety has recourse
against the other, that means that Surety B has recourse against Surety
A, and Surety A has recourse against Surety B. Then under section 85-
3-604(2) the refusal discharges Surety B since Surety B has recourse
against Surety A. In the alternative, if Surety B tenders full payment,
Surety A is discharged. That then leaves one of two possibilities, either
211. Jessee v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 154 Ga. App. 209, 267 S.E. 2d 803 (1980), seems
to conclude this. The surety complained that this interpretation would cause him to lose his right
to subrogation. But he tendered only part of the debt and thus would not be entitled to subroga-
tion anyway. See Arkansas's rule on this in note 164, supra, and the text at note 220, infra. In
addition, § 3-604 requires tender of full payment.
212. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-604 comment 2.
213. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 120(4) provided: "A person secondarily liable on the
instrument is discharged:
4. By a valid tender of payment made by a prior party.
214. L. SIMPSON, supra note 143, at 392. Simpson's book was published in 1950 before any
state had adopted the U.C.C. And the Restatement, with section 116, appeared in 1941.
215. See supra note 165.
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the tendering surety is also discharged or he is not. Let us consider the
possibility of discharge first. To argue that Surety A is also discharged,
we would use section 85-3-606(l)(a)216 which provides that a party is
discharged by the "holder" (in this case the creditor) when the holder
"releases" a person against whom the party has a right of recourse. If
the creditor's refusal discharges Surety B, the creditor by this act "re-
leases" Surety B. And since as we saw in the above paragraph Surety
A has a right of recourse against Surety B right up to the time of the
discharge, the release discharges Surety A. If this is true, and if a sin-
gle surety is not discharged by his own tender, then in regard to dis-
charge the result of a surety's tender depends upon how many sureties
there are. Surely the drafters did not intend that result.
Now let us consider the possibility that Surety A is not discharged
by his tender, but that Surety B is discharged. This means that a sub-
sequent tender of full payment by Surety B, to return the favor, will
not in turn discharge Surety A. For if B is discharged A no longer has
a right of recourse against him, and hence A cannot qualify to be dis-
charged under section 85-3-604(2). Surety B faces the same prospect if
he tenders first. Which generous soul then makes the tender? Do they
toss a coin or draw straws? Surely the drafters did not intend this di-
lemma either. Does the answer lie in an absurd ritual? Imagine both
sureties walking up to the creditor at the same time. They chant to-
gether proper words of tender, being careful to say, "I hereby tender in
full payment of a debt . . ." and so on, until they finish together end-
ing with words such as "failure to accept will be taken as refusal." If
the creditor then does not accept from one of them has he not refused
each so that each is discharged by the other's act and the refusal? Is
this fair to the single surety who has nobody to play such a silly scene
with?
The simplest solution is to suppose that the Code drafters never
intended this result and to rule that a surety is discharged when his
own tender is refused. The section need not be interpreted so as to pre-
vent the surety's discharge. It certainly does not expressly forbid the
discharge, and if one chooses to say that the section does not rule either
way, resort to section 1-103 will allow the matter to be governed by the
law of suretyship in general. Under that law the surety is discharged.
However, it may be that the attitude of the courts toward the uncom-
pensated surety is changing and that the courts are less sympathetic
toward him than before. It may be that courts favor the uncompen-
216. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-606 (1961), supra note 163.
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sated surety's discharge only to the extent of his loss. If that is so,
surely in a case such as this where the creditor's conduct is so aberra-
tional, there should be a presumption that the surety was harmed to the
full extent of his obligation. That would put the burden on the creditor
to prove the extent to which the surety was not harmed by the credi-
tor's refusal of tender.
c. Back to Normal Procedures
Return now to the normal situation. If the creditor accepts the
tender made by a surety, the surety then has several rights that he may
exercise to seek repayment. If there were other sureties, co-sureties,
who agreed to assume a pro rata share of the obligation, the surety who
pays the creditor the full amount of the debt has a right to collect on
those agreements.2 17 The term for his right is "contribution." The cases
do not reveal that the Arkansas courts have had to deal with legal
problems concerning the exercise of this right in commercial paper.
21 8
In proceeding against the principal debtor, an accommodation
party may proceed on the instrument. 19 This cause of action combines
(without replacing) two rights a surety has in equity, the right of sub-
rogation and the right to reimbursement. The first can be described as
an equitable assignment of the creditor's claim against the principal.
The surety must pay the entire debt,220 and he is then subject to the
same defenses and gets almost the same rights as the creditor. The
word "almost" is used because there is a possibility that a surety who
pays off the creditor at a discount will not be subrogated to the full
amount. 221 However, the surety may resort to his second right, reim-
bursement, even though he has not paid off the entire debt. The theory
of recovery here is not that he has been "assigned" the creditor's claim
but that the principal has impliedly promised to repay him for paying
the debt. The suit on the instrument does not arise from a new right.
And so, for instance if the surety who has paid is suing for the whole
debt, this is a subrogation suit using the procedure of a suit on a nego-
217. Id.
218. The right is recognized in Halford v. Southern Capital Corp., 279 Ark. 261, 650
S.W.2d 580 (1983).
219. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-415(5) (1961), supra note 135.
220. See supra note 164.
221. See Peters, supra note 162, at 869. There is a hint to this effect in Hanson v. Cheek,
251 Ark. 897, 475 S.W.2d 526 (1972) when the court concludes that "the appellees are accommo-
dation endorsers with the right of recourse to recover from the appellants any payment appellees
make upon the note." 251 Ark. at 900, 475 S.W.2d at 528 (emphasis supplied). This may mean
that they cannot collect the full amount of the note by paying less.
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tiable instrument. And the suit will be governed by the rule that subro-
gation is "steeped in equity and generally governed by equitable
principles." '222
V. TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN-AN UNUSUAL
ARKANSAS STATUTE
Section 4-105(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
"'Collecting bank' means any bank handling the item for collection
except the payor bank. . ....
However, in 1967 the Arkansas legislature amended this to pro-
vide: "'Collecting bank' means any bank handling the item for
collection .... "223
One conclusion that may be drawn is that now "collecting bank"
includes the payor bank. The reason for this change does not appear in
the Act itself, which makes several changes and which begins: "An Act
to Amend Act 185 of 1961, the Commercial Code, to Make the Same
Conform more Closely to the Uniform Code; to Correct Certain Cleri-
cal Errors in Said Act, and for Other Purposes."2'
This change however, makes this section conform less closely, not
more, to the U.C.C.; and the original wording did not contain a clerical
error. Moreover, the change produces confusion without any apparent
benefit because it raises the question: Did Arkansas intend to abolish
the doctrine of Price v. Neal?
225
To understand the significance of this, consider a bank's payment
of a check by mistake. Most payments by mistake by a bank, under
circumstances where checks should not be paid, fall into one (or more)
of four fact situations:
1. The drawer did not have enough money in his account to cover
the check.
2. The drawer ordered payment stopped but the order was
overlooked.
3. The drawer's name was forged.
4. An indorsement necessary for title was forged.
After the mistake is discovered, assuming that the person paid had
no knowledge that payment was by mistake, in two of the situations the
222. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Northwestern National Casualty Company, 268 Ark.
334, 335, 595 S.W.2d 938, 939 (1980).
223. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-105(d) (1961).
224. 1967 ARK. Acts 303, § 12.
225. Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
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bank can recover from the person it paid. The U.C.C. provides for re-
covery from the person paid in case of a forged indorsement 226 and in
case of an overlooked stop order (unless the person paid could have
collected from the drawer anyway).227 But if the person "finally" paid
is a holder in due course or has in good faith changed his position in
reliance, recovery is not provided for if the account does not have the
funds or if the drawer's name is forged.228
The rule that payment may not be recovered where payment was
over a forged drawer's signature is "the rule of Price v. Neal." To un-
derstand the relationship between section 4-105(d) and "the rule of
Price v. Neal," it may be helpful to have a legal description of what
happens, within the context of section 4-207, when checks are pur-
chased or paid. For recovery is based on section 4-207.
Suppose that Dan has an account in the Big Bank. He draws a
check for fifty dollars payable to Paul. It is stolen from Paul, his in-
dorsement is forged, and the thief transfers the check to the Little
226. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-417(1)(a) (1961) provides:
Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior transferor warrants to a
person who in good faith pays or accepts that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain payment or accept-
ance on behalf of one who has a good title;
And for payor banks § 85-4-207(l)(a) provides:
Each customer or collecting bank who obtains payment or acceptance of an item and
each prior customer and collecting bank warrants to the payor bank or other payor who
in good faith pays or accepts the item that
(a) he has a good title to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or acceptance on
behalf of one who has a good title;
227. Id. § 85-4-407(c) provides:
If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of the drawer or maker
or otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for objection by the drawer or maker,
to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent necessary to prevent loss to the
bank by reason of its payment of the item, the payor bank shall be subrogated to the
rights . . .
(c) of the drawer or maker against the payee or any other holder of the item with
respect to the transaction out of which the item arose.
228. Id § 85-3-418, supra note 41. And for bank collections, § 85-4-213(1) provides:
An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any of the following,
whichever happens first:
(a) paid the item in cash; or
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settlement and without
having such right under statute [J clearing house rule or agreement; or
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the drawer,
maker or other person to be charged therewith; or
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed to revoke the settlement in the
time and manner permitted by statute, clearing house rule or agreement. Upon final
payment under subparagraphs (b), (c) or (d) the payor bank shall be accountable for
the amount of the item.
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Store for goods. The owner of the Little Store takes it to the Other
Bank (where the Little Store's account is), indorses the check and re-
ceives fifty dollars cash. For purposes of section 4-207(2)(a) and (b),
the Little Store is a "customer," the check is an "item," the item was
"transferred," and the Little Store "received consideration" and "war-
ranted" to the Other Bank that it had good title (and also that Paul's
signature was genuine). 29 Suppose further that the theft is not discov-
ered and that the check is paid by the Big Bank to the Other Bank. For
the transaction between the two banks the U.C.C. uses other words,
and the rules of section 4-207(1)30 come into play. The Other Bank is
a "collecting bank" but it did not "transfer" and "receive a settlement
or other consideration." Instead it "obtain[ed] payment." In this case,
however, the same critical warranty that the Little Store gave to the
Other Bank-the warranty of title-is given by the Other Bank to the
Big Bank; and so we have a situation where the Little Store is liable to
the Other Bank, and the Other Bank is liable to the Big Bank. Because
the indorsement was forged, there was a breach of the warranty of
title.
Now, however, imagine a Price v. Neal situation. Dan's employee,
Paul, forges Dan's name to a check for fifty dollars made out to the
employee, and the employee exchanges it for goods at the Little Store
after indorsing it. Again the Little Store collects money from the Other
Bank, and the Other Bank is paid by the Big Bank. This time there is
no breach of warranty of title, however, because there was no forged
indorsement. The check was payable to the employee, and he indorsed
it. So the indorsement was proper although the name of the drawer was
forged. Also, although both the Little Store and the Other Bank were
indorsers, their indorsements were not forged. What the Other Bank
did was to present to the Big Bank a check to which it had good title,
but which should have been charged to the employee's account, if he
had one.23 Because there was no breach of warranty, the Other Bank
is not obligated to repay the Big Bank. Nor is it obligated to pay in a
229. Id. § 85-4-207(2)(a) and (b) provides:
(2) Each customer and collecting bank who transfers an item and receives a settlement
or other consideration for it warrants to his transferee and to any subsequent collecting
bank who takes the item in good faith that
(a) he has a good title to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or acceptance on
behalf of one who has a good title and the transfer is otherwise rightful; and
(b) all signature are genuine or authorized;
230. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85- 4 -207(l)(a), supra note 226.
231. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-404(1) (1961), supra, note 50.
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common-law restitution action,2 32 and the Other Bank will not demand
payment from the Little Store.
One more step will be necessary to see the significance of section
4-105(d). Suppose that instead of the check's being paid as in the para-
graph above, Dan had discovered the stolen check and forgery, had
ordered payment stopped, and the Big Bank had refused to pay the
Other Bank. Although the Big Bank could not have recovered from the
Other Bank the money it paid without knowledge that Dan's signature
was forged (as in the paragraph above), the Other Bank in this in-
stance (where the Big Bank did not pay) can recover from the Little
Store the fifty dollars cash. The reason is that the Little Store war-
ranted to its transferee that all signatures were genuine (and that in-
cluded Dan's) 233 while the Other Bank did not warrant this to the Big
Bank when it was paid in the paragraph above.23 4
Under Arkansas's version of section 4-105(d), unlike that in the
rest of the country, "collecting banks" include "payor banks". So it
could be argued that the Big Bank is thereby (as a collecting bank)
given rights against the Little Store, since the warranty of section 85-4-
207(2)(b) because of the change in wording runs to it as well as the
Other Bank. This is because the warranty runs not only to the Little
Store's "transferee" (the Other Bank) but also to "any subsequent col-
lecting bank." However, it is submitted that this argument should fail.
In the Arkansas version of the U.C.C. as well as the official text, war-
ranties to a payor and warranties to a transferee are kept separate.
They are also kept separate in the Article 3 equivalent of section 85-4-
207, which is section 85-3-417. Section 85-3-417 applied when the em-
ployee negotiated the check to Little Store, because the transferee was
not a bank. That section used the words "payment," "pays, ' '2 5 "trans-
fers," and "transferee" just as section 4-207 does, but uses and "any
subsequent holder '236 rather than "any subsequent collecting bank."
232. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 30 (1937) provides:
The holder of a bill of exchange or promissory note who has received payment thereof
from one whose name was forged thereon as a party, or from a drawee on a bill on
which the drawer's name was forged, is not thereby under a duty of restitution if he
paid value and received payment without reason to know that the signature was forged.
233. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4-207(2)(b) (1961), supra note 229.
234. Id. § 85-4-207(I), supra note 226.
235. Id. § 85-3-417(1), supra note 226.
236. Id. § 85-3-417(2) provides:
(2) Any person who transfers an instrument and receives consideration warrants to his
transferee and if the transfer is by indorsement to any subsequent holder who takes the
instrument in good faith that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain payment or accept-
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By keeping the warranties of section 3-417(1) separate from those
of section 3-417 (2) and the warranties of section 4-207(1) separate
from those of section 4-207(2), the U.C.C. makes it very plain that
payors of instruments whether individual human beings or banks do not
get the same rights as purchasers of the instruments. For purposes of
interpreting those sections, it must follow that "paying an item" is not
"taking an item", "obtaining payment" is not "transferring an instru-
ment", and "a person who pays" is neither a "transferee" nor a
"holder.""' 7
One minor problem might arise in interpreting the words of sec-
tion 3-417(1) and section 4-207(1) when Dan's signature has been
forged by Paul. Suppose Paul does not have an account with the Big
Bank. The Big Bank having paid The Other Bank has a right to collect
(arguably on the check) against Paul, the forger of Dan's name.2 38 Can
it, then, be argued from that, that the check only "seemed to be" paid?
Can it be said that in fact it was "purchased" by the Big Bank? If so,
the warranties of section 3-417(2) and section 4-207(2) do apply. The
answer is that, in the law at least, in this instance, "seeming to be
paid" is the same as being paid. Mistaken payment is still payment. It
must be "payment" as far as the U.C.C. is concerned, or neither sec-
tion 3-417(1)(a) nor section 4-207(a) would ever apply. Those subsec-
tions allow for recovery after a mistaken payment to one without title
by imposing liability on the one who "obtains payment." And mistaken
payment is still payment under both the U.C.C. and the law of restitu-
tion or there is no need for the rules that payment is final though
mistaken.
One can turn to sections other than section 4-105(d) and conclude
that in amending that section, the Arkansas Legislature did not intend
to abolish the rule of Price v. Neal. A simple and obvious way of abol-
ishing the rule would have been to amend section 3-417(1) and section
4-207(1) to add to them the warranty of section 3-417(2)(b) and sec-
tion 4-207(2)(b) that "all signatures are genuine and authorized." It
ance on behalf of one who has a good title and the transfer is otherwise rightful; and
(b) all signatures are genuine or authorized ...
237. This means that a payor in its position as a payor cannot be a holder. A person who, for
instance, buys travelers checks at his bank can make the payor the payee of his own personal
check given in payment. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-1 10(l)(b) (1961), supra, note 14. He may also
have his account in the same bank as his employer and when cashing his paycheck indorse it to
the bank. In the first case he creates property in the bank; in the second he transfers property to
the bank. And in either case the payor is a holder. But when either check is paid, the payor wears
two hats. It does not by paying itself become a holder.
238. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-3-404(1) (1961), supra note 50.
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did not do so. Second, the legislature could have provided for recovery
of payments in a separate section, as it provided for recovery in section
4-407239 (which allows subrogation when stop orders are overlooked),
and in that separate section it could have specifically allowed a right of
action after payments over forgeries. It did not do that either. As a
third possibility, the legislature could have excepted payment in case of
forgery from the final payment rules of section 3-418 and section 4-
213(1) but it did not. Surely had the legislature meant to change the
rule it would have resorted to one of these simpler and more direct
methods of doing so, rather than using such an indirect method as al-
tering section 4-105(d). One must conclude that the reason for the al-
teration lies somewhere else. This author has not yet determined what
that reason was, however.
A final observation on this dilemma may be in order. The rule of
Price v. Neal may be changed in Arkansas in the years ahead. It may
be abolished, depending on the final version of the New Uniform Pay-
ments Code. This Code is being drafted to amend or replace Articles 3
and 4 of the U.C.C. An underlying objective is to establish uniform
rules for all types of funds, whether paper is used or a card is used or
the transfer is electronic. One of the results would be that risk among
parties would be based on tort rather than warranty principles. The
person who transmits an unauthorized order to .pay money-using a
check or a card or sending it electronically-would be liable to all par-
ties "who pay or give value in exchange for the order." Thus all payors
as well as transferees could recover for having given money for forged
instruments. 40 Banks should be happier, the rules will be simpler, over
two hundred years of legal history will be immaterial, and law profes-
sors will have to use something else to fill a time slot in the Commercial
Paper course.
CONCLUSION
These reflections on the developments of Arkansas law concerning
commercial paper over the past two decades have focused on five ar-
eas-words, property and contractual rights, litigation, suretyship, and
one aspect of the check collection process. This is but one way of or-
ganizing most of the cases and statutes concerning commercial paper
that have appeared in the past twenty years and but one way of dis-
cussing the present state of this area of commercial law in Arkansas.
239. ARK. STAT. ANN. §85-4-407(i)(c), supra note 227.
240. For further discussion of this, see Benfield, supra note 3.
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Except in a few areas such as the case law which enforces gift checks,
and statutory law which does not except payors from those banks in the
check collection process known as "collecting banks," the law in Ar-
kansas is similar to that in the rest of the United States.
Any attempt to speculate on what this law will be like twenty
years from now would certainly have to consider the rapid changes in
technology. Payments and short-term borrowings are even now accom-
plished using plastic cards and electronic equipment as well as paper
and pens. Will longer term borrowing continue to involve signing a
promissory note written on a piece of paper? And before wondering
what will happen to the concept of negotiability (and its beneficiary,
the holder in due course) we must remind ourselves where it is now.
The U.C.C. lists four negotiable instruments: drafts, checks, certificates
of deposit, and notes.24 As for drafts and checks, the Arkansas Legis-
lature recently indicated that certain of these must continue to be nego-
tiable. 42 However, today there are certificates of deposit that are not
only not negotiable but also not transferable. And the negotiability of
promissory notes in consumer transactions is being limited, but then
Arkansas had limited it during pre-Code days.24
We can guess that the focus of "borrowing and paying" law will
be different. We can hope that it will be easier to understand. Because
we may suspect that with rapid changes in technology the law may in
the future change more quickly than before. And we will wonder if we
are going to have to learn new rules even faster.
241. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-104(2) (1961).
242. ARK. STAT. ANN. 66-2017 (Supp. 1983) provides:
Hereafter, all claims paid by any insurer authorized to do business in this State to any
person having a claim under any insurance contract for any type or types of insurance
authorized by the laws of this State issued by such insurer, shall be paid by check or
draft of the insurer to the order of the claimant to whom payment of the claim is due
pursuant to the policy provisions.
The reason is found in the section following it. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-2018 (Supp. 1983) provides:
No insurer shall intentionally or unreasonably delay, for more than three [3] business
days after presentment for collection, the processing of any properly executed and en-
dorsed check or draft issued in settlement of an insurance claim. It is the intent of the
General Assembly that insureds or claimants shall be paid for their settlement proceeds
at the earliest possible time. Any insurer violating this Section shall pay the insured or
claimant a penalty of two hundred dollars ($200) or fifteen percent (15%) of the face
amount of the check or draft, whichever is higher.
243. Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
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